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STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard

*

This Article examines state constitutions and health care rights. Close to a third of states’
constitutions recognize health, while the U.S. Constitution contains no reference. Ample scholarly
commentary exists on the absence of a right to health care under the U.S. Constitution, but little
attention has been paid to state constitutional law. This Article begins by explaining the absence
of a federal right and the rationale for looking to state constitutional protections for health. The
Article then provides a comprehensive survey of state constitutional provisions and judicial
decisions enforcing or interpreting them. The survey reveals certain common themes and limits,
which the Article catalogues and analyzes. The conclusion is that state constitutions, although
providing stronger textual support for health care rights than the U.S. Constitution, do not, when
applied, provide significantly greater guarantees. Nevertheless, state constitutional recognition of
health, as well as proposed state constitutional amendments that would expressly recognize health
rights, serve as important catalysts for federal and state legislation.

*

Professor, University of Kansas School of Law. Gratitude to Dr. Sharon Lee, for compelling me to consider this question, and Neal Johnson, for tireless research assistance. The
article benefited immeasurably from faculty workshops at University of the PacificMcGeorge School of Law; University of Kansas School of Law; American Society of Law,
Medicine, and Ethics Health Law Professors Conference; and AALS Conference on Clinical Legal Education; as well as comments by Judge Jeffrey Sutton, Bernard Black, Rob
Schwartz, Wendy Parmet, Kevin Outterson, Steve McAllister, Sandy McKenzie, Rick Levy,
Rob Glicksman, Chris Drahozal, Steve Ware, and Melanie Wilson.

1325

1326

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:5

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1327
I.

ABSENCE OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF
HEALTH................................................................................ 1328
A. Absence of Textual Support ...........................................1329
B. Charter of Negative Rights............................................. 1331
C. Constitutional Allocation of Powers ................................1337
D. Federalism Policies ....................................................... 1342

II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON HEALTH ............. 1347
A. Overview of State Constitutional Provisions .....................1347
B. Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions ................... 1348
1. Michigan ............................................................ 1348
2. New York ............................................................ 1350
3. North Carolina .................................................... 1353
4. Mississippi .......................................................... 1357
5. South Carolina .................................................... 1359
6. Montana ............................................................ 1360
7. New Jersey ........................................................... 1366
III. TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH LAW ............. 1368
A. Vulnerable Groups .......................................................1370
1. Mentally Ill ......................................................... 1370
2. Indigent .............................................................. 1373
3. Prisoners ............................................................. 1375
B. Types of Services ..........................................................1378
1. Public Health ...................................................... 1379
2. Environmental Health .......................................... 1383
3. Hospital Care ...................................................... 1385
4. Abortion .............................................................. 1386
C. State Constitutional Amendments .................................. 1388
IV. LESSONS FROM STATE CONSTITUTIONS ............................... 1391
A. Assessment ..................................................................1392
B. Prescription ................................................................. 1395
CONCLUSION............................................................................... 1401

June 2010]

STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND HEALTH CARE

1327

INTRODUCTION
Health care policymaking in the United States is currently focused
on federal reform. In crafting the legislation, lawmakers considered
a wide range of proposals to address myriad shortcomings of the current United States health care system, including rising numbers of
uninsured patients, rising health care costs, lack of access to care, and
limited accountability and quality controls. The merits and detriments of the existing system stem from the particular public-private
combination of health care delivery. On the public side, large government programs, at both the state and federal level, provide health
care to significant segments of the population. On the private side,
commercial health insurers sell policies to groups and individuals
who elect to purchase them. Competitive for-profit and non-profit
health care providers deliver the bulk of health care services, including to government program beneficiaries, through contractual arrangements. The system is grounded in core American principles of
free enterprise and individual rights, as well as moral commitment to
protect the less fortunate, themes expressed throughout the U.S.
Constitution and separate states’ constitutions.
Most everyone agrees that the system needs to be fixed, but there
is sharp disagreement about the best approach. The debates inevitably evoke fundamental values and priorities. One issue is whether
health care is a right or entitlement that government should provide
to citizens, or whether health care should be distributed like any other market-based good or service, based on private choice and ability
to pay. Another central theme is federalism and the respective roles
of states and the federal government in health care delivery. Previous
attempts to enact broad, federal health care reforms met opposition
on both fronts. Private industry feared heavy-handed government
regulation, and states feared one-size-fits-all solutions. The historic
1
passage of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act met
vigorous opposition before, during, and after passage, especially from
2
states and states’ rights proponents.

1

2

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (as
amended by Health Care and Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 11-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010)).
See Complaint at 21, Florida v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-91-RV-EMT (N.D. Fla., Mar. 23, 2010)
(complaint by thirteen states, asserting various constitutional arguments, including violation of the Tenth Amendment, against the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act);
Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius,
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Adding an essential and previously unheard voice to the health
care conversation, this Article examines state constitutional law.
Nearly one-third of states recognize “health” explicitly or implicitly in
their constitutions. It is instructive to consider the constitutional
weight that states give to health, whether by elevating health to the
status of a fundamental right, assigning state responsibility to guarantee health care to individuals, or merely identifying health as a public
concern. Constitutions are charter documents of sovereign states,
expressing fundamental, organizing principles and political norms of
a wide range of constituents. Therefore, these texts should be carefully considered to inform the health reform debate.
Part I of the Article briefly explains the well-settled conclusion
that there is no federal right to health and draws support for that
conclusion from the constitutional design and federalism policies.
Part II provides a comprehensive survey of state constitutional law,
identifying thirteen state constitutional provisions expressly mentioning health, as well as additional states that give constitutional weight
to health. Part III identifies trends in the state constitutions and suggests reasons underlying the inclusion and exclusion of certain persons and services, and the nature of any health right recognized. Finally, Part IV evaluates state constitutionalism on health, drawing
lessons for federal and state reforms.
I. ABSENCE OF U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION OF HEALTH
Proponents of the view that health is a fundamental right that the
U.S. government should provide to all would need to identify a
source of law supporting the claim. The first place to look for such a
guarantee would be the highest law in the land, the U.S. Constitution. This Part affirms the conclusion of courts and other scholars
that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly or implicitly recognize
health as a right. Several reasons justify that conclusion and point
toward state constitutions as more likely sources of fundamental
guarantees of health. First, the U.S. Constitution is primarily concerned with protecting individual liberties and freedom from government intrusion, not specifying governmental duties or obligations.
Second, protection of health, safety, and welfare falls squarely within
states’ Tenth Amendment reserved powers. Finally, states are better

No. 3:10cv88 (E.D. Va. Mar. 23, 2010) (seeking declaration that the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act violates federal enumerated powers).
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suited to address diverse health care needs and competing priorities
of their residents.
A. Absence of Textual Support
The U.S. Constitution contains no express textual reference and
has never been interpreted to provide any specific protection for
3
health, despite President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s impassioned
4
“Second Bill of Rights” State of the Union Address and recently proposed amendments by Representatives Jesse L. Jackson, Jr. and Pete
5
The Preamble, a precatory, non-binding provision, lists
Stark.
6
among the Nation’s goals, “promot[ing] the general Welfare.” Under Article I, Congress is empowered to tax and spend for “the gen7
eral Welfare,” but not health, specifically. The Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments provide that the government shall not deprive persons
8
of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” By contrast
to several state constitutions, the federal constitution does not ex-

3

4

5

6
7
8

See, e.g., TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 24 (2003) (exploring health care
entitlements in the United States and the threat of disentitlement); George France, The
Form And Context of Federalism: Meanings for Health Care Financing, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 649, 672 (2008) (“There is no generalized right to health care in either the U.S.
Constitution or in federal law.”); Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the International Human
Right to Health and Health Care in the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 353 (2008)
(“The Federal Constitution is silent on the matters of health and health care.”); Tom Stacy, The Courts, the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
77, 77 (1993–94) (“[T]he Constitution, as interpreted and enforced by the judiciary, has
virtually nothing to say” about distribution of health care.); Kenneth R. Wing, The Right to
Health Care in the United States, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 161, 161 (1993) (“There is nothing
that can be characterized—at least in any general sense—as a constitutional right to
health care in the United States.”).
President’s Message to Congress on the State of the Union, 12 PUB. PAPERS 41 (Jan. 11,
1944) (expressly including the “right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
achieve and enjoy good health”); see also Kinney, supra note 3, at 346 (discussing Roosevelt’s calling for a “second Bill of Rights”). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND
BILL OF RIGHTS (2004) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS] (arguing for a
new vision of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, constitutional history, and our current political scene); Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and Roosevelt’s
Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 205-216 (2005) (discussing Roosevelt’s “Second Bill of Rights” speech).
H.R.J. Res. 30, 110th Cong. (2007) (“Section 1: All persons shall enjoy the right to health
care of equal high quality. Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to enforce and
implement this article by appropriate legislation.”), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/query/z?c111:H.J.RES.30.
U.S. CONST. pmbl.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress powers to “provide for the . . . general
Welfare . . .”).
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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pressly reference the word “health” in any provision. Setting aside
well-meaning proposals, the likelihood of a federal constitutional
9
amendment identifying health as a right is all but unimaginable.
In other contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has found implicit
constitutional rights, most notoriously, privacy, in the “penumbras”
10
and “emanations” of the Constitution. One might suggest that the
right to health is implicitly and necessarily subsumed within the right
to life. But no court has been willing to read the Constitution so
broadly. Rather, the Court has expressly declined to recognize other
11
asserted fundamental welfare rights, including financial assistance,
12
13
housing and education. Federal courts have been increasingly reluctant to recognize new fundamental constitutional rights bearing
on individual health, such as the right of terminally ill patients to as14
15
sisted suicide or to access unapproved drugs to prolong their lives.
9

10

11

12
13

14

See Frank I. Michelman, Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away,
6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 663, 670 (2008) (discussing unlikelihood of “a welfare-state amendment”).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (“The foregoing cases suggest that
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”).
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (declining to find welfare rights in the
Constitution). See generally Robert H. Bork, Commentary, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695 (discussing skeptical views on
constitutional welfare rights); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the
Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 411 (1993) (“[C]onstitutional claims
pointing towards minimum welfare rights have been systematically rebuffed.”).
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (holding that there is no fundamental right to
housing).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (declining to recognize
federal right to public education); see also Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450,
458 (1988) (“Nor have we accepted the proposition that education is a ‘fundamental
right,’ . . . which should trigger strict scrutiny when government interferes with an individual’s access to it.” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33–36)); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982) (“Public education is not a ‘right’ granted to individuals by the Constitution. But
neither is it merely some governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of
social welfare legislation.” (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35)); Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the
National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 550, 564–73 (1992) (discussing U.S. Supreme
Court cases on public education); Daniel S. Greenspahn, A Constitutional Right to Learn:
The Uncertain Allure of Making a Federal Case Out of Education, 59 S.C. L. REV. 755, 768
(2008) (“Rodriguez has been broadly viewed as denying a right to an education under the
Constitution”); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement Model
for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1659 (2007) (describing
Court’s holding in Rodriguez and citing scholarship advocating federal right to public
education).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997); cf. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health,
497 U.S. 261 (1990) (finding Due Process liberty interest in patient’s right to refuse lifesustaining treatment but upholding state law requiring clear and convincing evidence of
patient’s wishes).
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Scholars made an intriguing but unavailing case for a property right
to health care as a “public good,” based on the public’s considerable
investment in medical education, research, and government health
16
care programs. Several reasons explain the U.S. Constitution’s absence of textual recognition of health and, by contrast, several states’
inclusion of health in their constitutions.
B. Charter of Negative Rights
The U.S. Constitution traditionally is considered a charter of neg17
ative rights, whereas state constitutions may embody a broader view.
The federal document limits governmental interference with individual rights but does not affirmatively grant rights to individuals or es18
tablish mandatory duties on the government. Under the Constitution, we have negative rights to be free from government
interference, but not affirmative rights to government services or pro19
tection. Other countries, by contrast, do provide affirmative rights

15

16

17

18

19

See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495
F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that there is no constitutional right to access experimental drugs); cf. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (rejecting Commerce Clause
and other constitutional challenges to federal authority to prohibit marijuana use by seriously ill patients under state law). See generally Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106
MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008) (regarding courts’ reluctance to recognize new fundamental
rights).
Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED.
65, 67 (2008) (“[A]lthough American law has not directly created a right to health care,
Americans’ public investment in the medical industry has.”).
Robert F. Williams, Rights, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 25–26 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (discussing absence of positive rights in Federal Constitution and noting
presence in some state constitutions).
See Barksy v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472–73 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The
Bill of Rights does not say . . . . what government must give, but rather what it may not
take away.”); Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill
of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people but that
it might do too much to them.”).
See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271, 2273 (1990)
(scrutinizing the “conclusory incantation[s]” of a negative constitution); Frank B. Cross,
The Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857, 886–87 (2001) (describing how courts,
even very liberal courts, have declined to implement any rights protecting the financial
interests of the impoverished); David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 886 (1986) (“[T]here remain suggestions of limited affirmative
duties in modern state-action cases, where the state has taken any action at all.”); Helen
Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1133 (1999) (describing the Supreme Court’s view of federal constitution as a “charter of negative rather than positive liberties”); Mark Tushnet, Civil Rights
and Social Rights: The Future of the Reconstruction Amendments, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1207,
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21

in their constitutions; ours is viewed as exceptional. Rationales for
declining to recognize affirmative constitutional rights include the
22
cost of guaranteeing government services, the inappropriateness of
23
courts adjudicating disputes over policy and budget, and a heritage
24
of free enterprise and economic liberties.

20

21

22

23

24

1213 (1992) (“Affirmative governmental action seems to be required to promote social
rights . . . . In contrast, civil rights seem to be largely negative [merely requiring governments] to stand aside [and] not interfere.”). But see Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the
Constitution: Public Health and the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 267, 271–77 (1993) (rebutting conventional assumptions about negative and positive
rights and the framers’ view of government’s role in health care).
See Eleanor D. Kinney & Brian Alexander Clark, Provisions for Health and Health Care in the
Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285, 285 (2004) (analyzing
the provisions of the constitutions of countries that address health and health care); Cass
R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?, 56
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 4–8 (2005) (listing Switzerland, South Africa, India, Norway, Russia,
and other examples of countries that specify social and economic rights in their constitutions); see also Lisa Forman, Justice and Justiciability: Advancing Solidarity and Justice through
South Africans’ Right to Health Jurisprudence, 27 MED. & L. 661 (2008) (exploring the South
African Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on the right to health); Puneet K. Sandhu,
Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can the United States Learn from Foreign Models
of Health Rights Jurisprudence?, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1151 (2007) (arguing that the experiences
of South Africa and Canada suggest that the creation of a legal right to health care in the
United States would not raise justiciability problems).
See SUNSTEIN, SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 4, at 127–38 (discussing constitutional
exceptionalism); Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 444–53 (2008) (reframing the issue of positive versus
negative rights and surveying other countries’ constitutional recognition of social and
economic rights); Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1582–83 (2006) (defending
American Exceptionalism and unwillingness to conform to international norms, as part
of “a special and unique destiny to lead the rest of the world to freedom and democracy”).
But see STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 37–52 (1999) (suggesting that it may be just as, if not more, expensive
for courts to guarantee contract, tort, and property rights as affirmative social welfare
rights); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 6–7 (suggesting that costs of ensuring fair trials under
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments are much more costly and time consuming than implementation of social programs); Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1214–15 (noting
that positive governmental action is required as much for protection of civil rights to vote,
free exercise, or free speech as social rights to adequate housing, food, or employment).
See Bandes, supra note 19, at 2327–30 (discussing institutional competence argument);
Michelman, supra note 9, at 668–71 (discussing argument “that courts are ill-equipped for
fine-tuned appraisals of governmental efforts in this field”); Sager, supra note 11, at 420
(“[I]mmensely complex questions of social strategy and social responsibility [are] far better addressed by the legislative and executive branches of government [and] seem virtually out of the reach of the judiciary absent special circumstances.”); Sunstein, supra note
20, at 16 (“American courts have been reluctant to recognize social and economic rights,
in part because of a belief that enforcement and protection of such rights would strain
judicial capacities.”).
Bandes, supra note 19, at 2297, 2300-08 (explaining “penalty/subsidy distinction” for
Court’s abortion funding decisions); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 17–18 (describing the
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Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected suggestions to recognize affirmative rights to various public benefits, ba25
sic subsistence, or services. The government has no constitutional
obligation to protect individuals from circumstances that endanger
their health or well-being, as the Court famously held in DeShaney v.
26
Winnebago County Department of Social Services, denying a claim against
the state by a severely abused child for failing to protect him from his
27
own father. The government also is not required to provide or pay
for medical services even if a person’s constitutionally protected
28
rights to life or privacy are implicated. For example, in Harris v.
McRae, the Court squarely held that states have no constitutional ob29
ligation to pay for abortions, even when the woman’s life is at risk.
A woman has a constitutional right to choose an abortion, but the
30
right is not unduly burdened just because she cannot pay. States

25
26
27

28

29

30

“cultural explanation” that social and economic rights are “correlated with the strength
of socialist or left-wing elements”).
For example, see cases supra notes 11–13.
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 87 (2d ed.
2008) (discussing DeShaney as example of Supreme Court’s “remain[ing] faithful to a
negative conception of the Constitution, even in the face of dire personal consequences”); Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1155 (describing Deshaney as a “notorious” example of the “baseline assumption that the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee positive
rights against the government”).
See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196 (“[T]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative
right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or
property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.”); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 317 (1982) (“As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within its border.”).
448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (“[A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of
a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation. Indigency falls into the latter category.”); see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
469 (1977) (“The Constitution imposes no obligation on the States to pay for the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed to pay any of the medical
expenses of indigents.”).
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) (rejecting challenge to state
ban on using state facilities for abortions, noting that “the Due Process Clauses generally
confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to
secure life, liberty, or property interests.”) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196)); Maher,
432 U.S. at 473–74 (noting that right to abortion “protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom whether to terminate her pregnancy” but imposes “no limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and to implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds”); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (finding no Equal Protection violation in state Medicaid program funding childbirth and therapeutic abortions but not non-therapeutic abortions);
see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991) (upholding federal regulation prohibiting federal funding to family planning facilities that provide abortion counseling);
James F. Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal, and Policy Analysis,
59 TEX. L. REV. 1345, 1378–80 (1981) (discussing abortion cases and concluding that
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may voluntarily decide to provide certain government benefits, but
31
nothing requires states to give services away for free. With respect to
health care, the Court has recognized only a narrow right to medical
32
care for prisoners and others in custody.
Beyond those exceptions, the only federal constitutional protections for health derive from the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. But those provisions are implicated only when the government voluntarily assumes a role in providing health care services, as it
has under federal programs like Medicare and Medicaid. For Equal
Protection purposes, there is a fairly strong case that any government
health care services, whether federal or state, must be provided on a
33
nondiscriminatory basis. The chances of an Equal Protection claim
succeeding, however, turn largely on the level of scrutiny applied.
Claims alleging discriminatory provision of services would likely receive the lowest level, rational basis scrutiny, unless racial discrimina34
tion or other suspect classes were involved. Thus, almost any go-

31

32

33

34

“government apparently is free to allocate its scarce medical resources in accordance with
its own sense of priorities”); Wing, supra note 3, at 164–66 (discussing abortion cases in
context of asserted right to health care).
See Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988) (“The Constitution does
not require that such service be provided at all, and it is difficult to imagine why choosing
to offer the service should entail a constitutional obligation to offer it for free.”).
See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 322 (holding that an involuntarily confined mentally disabled
individual had a right to minimally adequate training to avoid placement in physical restraints but not a broad right to care and treatment); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104,
107 (1976) (holding that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners”
violates the Eighth Amendment but finding no violation where prisoner was seen seventeen times over three months); David W. Burgett, Substantive Due Process Limits on the Duration of Civil Commitment for the Treatment of Mental Illness, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 205,
213 n.32 (1981) (explaining that “right to treatment” does not suggest affirmative right to
state services, but rather condition on states’ rights to confine citizens).
See Blumstein, supra note 30, at 1381–85 (considering the role of the Equal Protection
Clause and the provision of health services); Currie, supra note 19, at 881–82 (1986)
(“The only requirement being equality, in theory the state could have corrected the constitutional flaw by abolishing its entire welfare program.”); Stacy, supra note 3, at 82 (“But
once the government chooses to devote resources to health care, it must do so in a way
that promotes rough equality of access . . . .”); Wing, supra note 3, at 164 (“If the term
right to health care has any relevance in describing constitutional doctrine in the United
States, it is in reference to those constraints imposed on the government’s discretion
once it has exercised its broadly defined powers to provide or finance health or healthrelated benefits.”).
See, e.g., Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 462–63 (finding no Equal Protection violation in state
school bus fee applied only to nonreorganized school districts); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450
U.S. 221 (1981) (rejecting Equal Protection challenge and applying rational basis scrutiny
to uphold state Medicaid benefits classification); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535
(1972) (finding no Fourteenth Amendment violation in state’s system for allocating fixed
pool of welfare money); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (applying rational
basis scrutiny to review state’s allocation of welfare benefits disproportionately to large
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vernmental justification for drawing lines among individuals is likely
35
to pass courts’ constitutional muster. Litigants have succeeded in
Equal Protection challenges to states’ denial of public benefits to new
36
residents. Nevertheless, Equal Protection does not get to the root of
the issue: Whether government is obligated to provide health care in
the first place.
Constitutional claims to health theoretically also could be brought
37
under the Due Process clause. Accepting that health is not a constitutionally protected right, any Due Process claim, like any Equal Protection claim, would be viable only if the government voluntarily undertakes to provide health care. Even then, the statute or regulation
establishing the government service would have to create a legitimate
38
claim of entitlement. Furthermore, the government would be liable
under Due Process only if it unjustly deprived individuals of the
39
health care service or benefit. Courts have been reluctant to find
enforceable, individual rights in broad legislative schemes or admin-

35

36

37

38

39

and small families); see Wing, supra note 3, at 173–74 (discussing Equal Protection claim
and unlikelihood of court identifying an implicated suspect class).
See Barnett, supra note 15, at 1480 (suggesting that claimant “needs a ticket into ‘Scrutiny
Land’ where the government must justify its restrictions” by demonstrating a fundamental right, “[o]therwise, she automatically loses”); Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1153 (describing how “prevalent understanding of rationality review” is that it “is not review at all”
and “signals the Court’s view that a claim does not merit its institutional attention”). But
see U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (striking down amendment
to Food Stamp Act intended to exclude “hippies” and “hippie communes” from eligibility); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (holding unconstitutional state welfare program’s exclusion of individuals who had not lived in the state for a year, finding it
was no basis for distinguishing old and new residents).
See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 498–507, 511 (1999) (holding that California durational residency requirement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits violated Fourteenth Amendment right to travel); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa Co.,
415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (holding that Arizona’s one-year residency requirement for free
medical care to indigents violated Equal Protection and right to travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S.
at 641–42 (holding that the one-year residency requirement for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) violated Equal Protection and right to travel).
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (holding that adequate due process was
provided to person whose Social Security disability benefits were terminated); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring due process before termination of benefits); see
also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (requiring hearing before suspension or expulsion of public school students).
See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1972) (requiring a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” to create a property interest in continued employment after the expiration
of a contract).
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261 (finding the Due Process Clause required a pretermination
hearing because welfare recipients are destitute, without funds, and in brutal need, and
deprivation “without a prior hearing . . . is unconscionable”) (citation omitted).
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40

istrative regulations. Nor are lawmakers anxious to ascribe entitlement status to government services provided under federal statutes
and allow remedies to individuals who are denied or lose government
41
services. For example, no one can claim a right to pension or health
insurance benefits upon reaching retirement age, despite paying
42
mandatory payroll taxes to the Social Security Trust Fund, even if
43
Congress repeals the Social Security Act. The narrow Equal Protec-

40

41

42

43

See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) (narrowing the availability of the
§ 1983 action under federal statutes); see also Bowen v. Michigan Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 678 (1986) (allowing judicial review based on challenge to validity of
Medicare regulations but not benefits calculation); Blumstein, supra note 30, at 1375
(noting limits on judicial review of benefits claims); Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413,
416–17 (2008) (suggesting Gonzaga endangers fragile Medicaid entitlement); Kinney, supra note 3, at 360–61 & nn.171–72 (noting the threat to procedural due process by the
“judicial sanction of the diminished status of benefits in government entitlement programs due to their statutory definition” and citing cases); cf. United States v. Erika, Inc.,
456 U.S. 201, 206 (1982) (barring judicial review of administrative determinations of the
amount of Medicare payments).
See, e.g., Colson v. Sillman, 35 F.3d 106, 108, 110 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that applicants
for county’s physically handicapped children’s program had no “legally cognizable property-type interest in a government benefit” or “claim of entitlement” to state services);
White v. Moses Taylor Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 776, 788 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (denying uninsured
patient’s claimed right to treatment based on defendant hospital’s acceptance of federal
funds); JOST, supra note 3, at 24–51 (discussing constitutional issues with respect to federal health entitlement programs); Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1173 (noting Congress’s
1996 decision to eliminate the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, “devolving” instead to block grants to states, and the statute’s “purport[ing] to
eliminate public assistance as a federal entitlement”); Kinney supra note 3, at 360 n.173
(citing statutes affirmatively stating that benefits are not entitlements). See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 107, 108–09 (2005) (discussing the
Court’s entitlement approach to due process with respect to government benefits).
See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76–379, § 1432, 53 Stat. 1360,
1387 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 3101-3128 (2002)) (program funding federal insurance for disabled and elderly persons); I.R.C. § 3101(a) (2002)(tax funding national
old-age, survivors, and disability insurance); I.R.C. § 3101(b) (2002) (tax funding hospital
insurance); I.R.C. §§ 3101-28 (2002) (FICA); JOST, supra note 3, at 64–65 (observing the
common perception of Social Security and Medicare as earned pensions or social insurance trust funds but noting that “in fact, the relationship between contributions made
and pensions withdrawn from social insurance funds is quite tenuous”); Benjamin A.
Templin, The Public Trust in Private Hands: Social Security and the Politics of Government Investment, 96 KY. L.J. 369, 369 n.2 (2008) (“[M]ost of the monies collected from the FICA
payroll tax immediately go out to pay benefits to current retirees. What is not immediately paid out as benefits is invested in government bonds in a Trust Fund. . . . but it’s not
nearly enough to fund the expected benefits of future retirees.”).
See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (upholding Social Security Act amendment
terminating benefits of aliens who are deported on certain grounds); JOST, supra note 3,
at 30–34 (noting the use of the word “entitlement” in Medicare and Medicaid statutes
and Internal Revenue Code but a lack of meaningful, enforceable rights after ERISA).
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tion and Due Process challenges to government health care services
do not establish an affirmative federal constitutional right to health.
C. Constitutional Allocation of Powers
The federal structure of the U.S. Constitution provides additional
support for turning to state constitutional provisions on health. Article I assigns certain enumerated powers to the federal government.
All remaining powers are reserved to the states under the Tenth
44
Amendment. That allocation of power is constitutionally grounded
and part of the Framers’ design to facilitate centralized coordination
at the federal level, on the one hand, and diffusion of power and re45
spect for state sovereignty, on the other. While the Constitution allows both federal and state governments to address health, the responsibility falls more squarely within states’ reserved powers.
Federal enumerated powers include the power to tax and spend
for the general welfare, commerce power, national security powers,
46
and the catch-all necessary and proper clause. Most federal health
legislation is enacted under the spending or commerce powers, including Social Security and Medicare for the elderly and disabled,
Medicaid for needy individuals, and the Children’s Health Insurance
47
Program (CHIP). Congress can also use the spending power to en44

45

46
47

See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (describing state police powers as
“immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing [sic] within the territory of a
State, not surrendered to the general government”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 277 (1998) (describing Federal Constitution as document of grants and state constitutions as documents of limits).
See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918 (1997) (“It is incontestable that the
Constitution established a system of ‘dual sovereignty.’”); South Carolina v. Baker, 485
U.S. 505, 533 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions—in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell.”) (quoting
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 381 (2d. ed. 1988)); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and
“Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 816 (1998) (“The national government
has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of federal law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a corresponding reservoir of state
power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1, 3; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002) (recognizing Medicaid as spending power legislation); Atkins v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 154, 156–57
(1986) (describing Medicaid legislation); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)
(recognizing Social Security Act as valid exercise of spending power for the general welfare); Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 336, 342 (1970) (discussing
the historical evolution of federal health laws and recognition of the Social Security Law
of as a legitimate exercise of the spending power); Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Fe-
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tice states to enact laws or implement programs by conditioning federal funds on states’ compliance with broad federal program man48
dates. Medicaid and SCHIP are prime examples of that sort of co49
operative federalism.
States with approved programs receive a
percentage-on-the-dollar match from the federal government for
50
every state dollar spent. Accordingly, states are incentivized to provide generous public benefits, while the federal government shifts a
51
portion of the funding burden to states. The prominence of cooperative federalism in government health care programs demonstrates
states’ central role in that aspect of the U.S. health care delivery system.
States retain vast powers and broad discretion to carry out state
52
policy objectives. The Framers recognized that states bear primary

48

49

50

51
52

deralism and Health Care Policy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 861, 872 (1998) (“With the enactment
of Medicare in 1965, the federal government assumed responsibility for acute care of the
elderly.”).
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (conditioning federal highway funds
on states enacting laws limiting alcohol sales to minors and introducing limits on conditional spending power).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006) (Medicaid); 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2006) (SCHIP); Atkins, 477
U.S. at 156–57 (describing Medicaid as a joint federal-state partnership); Schweiker v.
Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 36–37 (1981) (describing Medicaid similarly); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308 (1980) (“Medicaid . . . is a cooperative endeavor in which the
Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in
furnishing health care to needy persons.”); Huberfeld, supra note 40, at 419 (“Medicaid is
a classic example of cooperative federalism . . . .”); Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 5, 10 (2004) (“Medicaid followed the tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs,
enacted pursuant to Congress’s spending clause powers, which condition the receipt of
federal funds by states that elect to participate on compliance with a series of structural
and operational conditions of participation.”); see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical
Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1550
(2007) (“[C]ooperative federalism [programs] typically involve a federal statute that regulates a risk or addresses a social ill or need [but] do not depend solely on federal actors
for their implementation and enforcement.”); Frank R. Strong, Cooperative Federalism, 23
IOWA L. REV. 459, 479–82 (1938) (introducing a symposium on “cooperative federalism”).
As one of his first acts in office, President Obama signed legislation expanding (and renaming, as CHIP) SCHIP. See Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act
of 2009 (CHIPRA), Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123 Stat. 8 (2009).
See Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 860–61 (1990) (providing a program overview); Elizabeth A.
Weeks, Cooperative Federalism and Health Care Reform: The Medicare Part D “Clawback” Example, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 79, 94–96 (2007) (describing the Medicaid program).
See Weeks, supra note 50, at 95 & n.132 (citing Strong, supra note 51, at 479–82).
See Rodriguez, supra note 44, at 278 (“[S]tate political entities may exercise all powers
(except as limited by the national constitution) necessary to carry out state goals.”).
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responsibility for people’s lives, liberties, and property. Health, welfare, and safety fall squarely within states’ traditional reserved police
54
powers. In addition, states’ parens patriae powers encompass vulnerable members of society, including the mentally ill, children, and
55
poor, who may have special health care needs. States may also act
within the sphere of enumerated federal powers as long as their actions are not prohibited by federal law and do not conflict with, impede the purpose of, or intrude upon an area of exclusive federal
56
regulation, as a matter of preemption.
Most states have broadly exercised their reserved powers, enacting
a wide range of regulations governing the practice of medicine and
57
other health professions, licensing and operation of medical facili-

53

54

55
56

57

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 319 (James Madison) (E. Bourne ed. 1937); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 17, at 113 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed. 1937); Stanley Mosk,
State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1083 n.11
(1985) (citing same); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV.
499, 525 (1995) (“The Framers envisioned that the vast majority of governance would be
at the state and local levels and that federal actions would be relatively rare and limited.”); Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1166 (“Federal rationality review also rests on the
related assumption that states and localities are normatively superior to the national government in dealing with the everyday stuff of life: family relations, public schooling, and
the like.”).
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (noting that “States historically have
been sovereign” in areas such as “family law[,]” “criminal law enforcement[, and] education”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24–25 (1905) (“The authority of the State
to enact this [mandatory vaccination] statute is to be referred to what is commonly called
the police power—a power which the State did not surrender when becoming a member
of the Union under the Constitution. Although this court has refrained from any attempt
to define the limits of that power, yet it has distinctly recognized the authority of a State to
enact quarantine laws and ‘health laws of every description;’ indeed, all laws that relate to
matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of other States.”).
See infra notes 238–42 and accompanying text (describing parens patriae power).
See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321, 347–53 (1903) (describing coexisting Federal Commerce Power and state police powers to regulate commerce); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) (declaring as invalid state laws that
“retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control[] the operations” of federal laws); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (2000) (“Although the Constitution makes
a few of the federal government’s powers exclusive, the states retain concurrent authority
over most of the areas in which the federal government can act.”) (citations omitted). See
generally Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994)
(examining standard views of preemption); Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008) (reviewing comparative institutional analysis
through the lens of preemption).
See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding Oklahoma statute restricting performance of eye examinations and prescription to licensed optometrists and ophthalmologists); Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1888) (upholding state physician licensure requirements).
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59

ties, and the business of health insurance. States establish public
health departments and agencies dedicated to protecting the health
60
and welfare of residents. In addition, most states accept the conditional spending “carrot” and provide health care in cooperation with
61
the federal government. Many states also enact their own initiatives
62
funded and administered solely at the state level.
States’ reserved powers offer unique opportunities to address so63
cial welfare concerns. Federal constitutional law establishes a floor,
58

59

60
61

62

63

See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Regulation of Health Facilities and Services by “Certificate of
Need,” 59 VA. L. REV. 1143, 1144–47 (1973) (surveying state certificate-of-need (CON)
laws); Patrick John McGinley, Beyond Health Care Reform: Reconsidering Certificate of Need
Laws In a “Managed Competition” System, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 141, 144–47 (1995) (describing history and operation of state CON laws).
See McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(a) (2006) (“The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.”). The McCarran-Ferguson
Act was Congress’s explicit reaffirmation of the primary role of states in insurance regulation, following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), upholding application of federal antitrust laws to interstate insurance contracts. The Act made clear that “regulation and taxation by the several States
of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the
Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of
such business by the several States.” 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006). State health insurance regulation of employer health plans is significantly restricted by the federal Employee Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001–1461).
See GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 149–55 (describing the history of state and local public
health regulation).
See Kinney, supra note 50, at 855–57 (describing the current “magnitude of the Medicaid
program” and federal and state financial and administrative commitments); Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L.
REV. 115, 120 (1995) (noting many existing “cooperative federalism” health care programs); Weeks, supra note 50, at 79–80, 79 n.5 (discussing cooperative federalism, Medicare, and Medicaid).
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 62–75 (1995) (describing state experimentation in the 1980s, including varying work programs under the Federal Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program); Tammy Murray, Note, State Innovation in Health Care: Congress’ Broad Spending Power Under a National Health Care System Will
Stifle State Laboratories of Democracy, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 263, 271–72 (2006) (describing
state health care financing and other reform efforts); Rich & White, supra note 47, at
872–74 (describing state initiatives).
See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 113 (1988) (“[S]tate
constitutions are important determinants of who gets what, when, and how in America . . . .”); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 149 (1998) (describing
states’ early recognition of responsibility for social welfare); Daniel Gordon, Superconstitutions Saving the Shunned: The State Constitutions Masquerading as Weaklings, 67 TEMP. L. REV.
965, 970 (1994) (“[S]tate constitutions serve as the predominant source of protection for
individual rights in the United States . . . .”); Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the
Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 464 (1996) (observing that states have the opportunity to address fairness controversies not being resolved satisfactorily at the federal
level).
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requiring states to recognize at least that minimum level of protection to individual rights. But states may go above the federal floor
64
and accord even greater protection. While federal constitutional jurisprudence has rejected the notion of a constitutional right to
health, states could recognize such a right under their own constitu65
tions. Justice William Brennan, in a series of articles, expressly
urged that states could and should expand protection for individual
66
rights, continuing the Warren Court’s civil rights jurisprudence.
States have embraced that charge to varying degrees, as we shall see.

64

65

66

See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280–82 (1990) (recognizing that
Missouri is entitled to accord stronger protection to preservation of life than federal law
by requiring clear and convincing evidence to terminate life support); see also Buzbee, supra note 49, at 1555 (“[F]ederal floors retain the benefits of multiple regulatory voices,
protections, and diverse regulatory modalities.”); James A. Gardner, The “States-AsLaboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 475, 483 (1996) (discussing Cruzan); Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49
OR. L. REV. 125, 182 (1970) (urging examination of civil rights claims arising under state
constitutions before turning to federal protections); Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 41, 51 (2006) (referring to “the truism that state courts are legally entitled to interpret their state constitutions as more protective of liberty than the
Federal Constitution”); Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxis in Modern State Constitutionalism:
New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
283, 286–89 (2003) (“‘New judicial federalism’ generally refers . . . to the increased tendency of state courts to interpret state charters as sources of rights independent of the
Federal Constitution and interpretations of the United States Supreme Court.”).
See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1961)
[hereinafter The Bill of Rights]; William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) [hereinafter State Constitutions]; William
J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians
of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986).
See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
762 (1992) (noting that Brennan urged states to look to “state constitutions as potentially
more generous guarantors of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution as construed by
the Burger Court” and others’ characterizing Brennan’s articles as “the ‘Magna Carta’ of
state constitutionalism”); Kahn, supra note 63, at 464 (“[Brennan] was eager to preserve
the judicial ideals of the 60s and 70s. State constitutionalism represented a kind of forum
shopping for liberals.”); Mosk, supra note 53, at 1081 (“For the liberal, there is the prospect of continued expansion of individual rights and liberties; the work of the Warren
Court can be carried on at the state level.”); Rodriguez, supra note 44, at 271 (describing
Brennan’s “strategic effort . . . to highlight the value of plumbing the states for individual
rights protections in the face of conservative retrenchment”); Robert A. Schapiro, Identity
and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 420 (1998) (“The renewed
interest in state constitutions was prompted by the desire to entrench and advance the
accomplishments of the Warren Court at a time when the federal judiciary was becoming
hostile to the expansion of certain claims of individual rights.”).
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D. Federalism Policies
Several familiar federalism policy arguments further suggest that
constitutional recognition of health is better grounded in state rather
than federal law. State legislators may be more accessible and res67
ponsive to constituents’ interests. Local representatives also may
represent the particular values and concerns of their communities,
68
which may not be shared by the entire nation. Some scholars reject
the notion that community values can be defined strictly by reference
69
to state boundaries. Even if not aligned with state borders, giving
voice to diverse views of the separate sovereign states is a core tenet of
70
our federal system. Different territories may have different tastes
71
and needs, especially on social policy matters.

67

68

69

70

71

See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 575 n.18 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (“The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at local
levels of government, where people with firsthand knowledge of local problems have
more ready access to public officials . . . .”); Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 527 (“[T]o the
extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people,
and democratic ideals are more fully realized.”); Betsy J. Grey, The New Federalism Jurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 475, 511 (2002) (noting that one
value of federalism is “foster[ing] governments that are more responsive than Congress
to the needs of local citizens”).
See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 965 (1982) (suggesting that state constitutional interpretation should consider the state’s “peculiarities,”
including “its land, its industry, its people, its history”); Peter D. Jacobson, The Federalist
Approach to Health Care and its Limitations: Introductory Remarks, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y vii, xiv (2007–08) (“The individual states are closer to the people, and hence better
equipped to reflect their plurality of values.”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 403 (discussing
the view that state constitutional interpretation “should be guided by various indicia of
state distinctiveness”).
See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 66, at 823 (“[W[e are a nation, which is to say that we constitute collectively a certain community.”); James A. Gardner, What is a State Constitution?, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1025–26 (1993) (considering the role of the state constitution in the
United States); Long, supra note 64, at 59–61 (discussing Gardner’s notion of “romantic
subnationalism”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 441 (“The mistake underlying the various
theories of state constitutional interpretation . . . is the conflation of the political unit of
the state with an assumed underlying organic community.”).
See Abrahamson, supra note 68, at 966 (considering the positive advantages of having
both federal and state constitutions); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and
Principle, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 399, 423 (1987) (“Many states today espouse cultural values distinctively their own.”); Long, supra note 64, at 101 (“Diversity among the states also
permits mobile Americans to vote with their feet.”).
See Alan R. Weil & James R. Tallon, Jr., The States’ Role in National Health Reform, 36 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 690, 690 (2008) (“[S]tate policies can be more closely tailored to local
economic conditions and can reflect local values . . . .”); cf. Gardner, supra note 66, at
816–17 (describing but later rebutting view that variations in state constitutions “reflect
differences in the fundamental value choices and character of the people who made the
constitutions”).
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Political judgments about particular reform proposals are products of
personal experience, political ideology, and local economic and social
conditions. These factors change substantially as one moves about the
United States. If change is to be workable and acceptable, it must take
account of the real differences between New York and Idaho, Wisconsin
72
and Louisiana.

Accordingly, state constitutional rights and values may offer a collection of views of citizens across the country.
In addition, states serve as laboratories of democracy, experimenting and crafting solutions to problems, which can be borrowed by
73
other states and the federal government. One state’s experience
enshrining a constitutional, enforceable right to health care may
counsel for or against similar enactments in other states or at the federal level. Massachusetts’s 2006 comprehensive state health reform
plan offers a recent example of a state experiment to which other
74
states and federal policymakers are looking for ideas and lessons.
California attempted similar reforms but found the model difficult to

72
73

74

Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 61, at 116.
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments
without risk to the rest of the country.”); see Chemerinsky, supra note 53, at 528–29 (“A final argument that is frequently made for protecting federalism is that states can serve as
laboratories for experimentation.”); Gardner, supra note 64, at 486–87 (suggesting that
the states-as-laboratories approach produces potentially valuable information about policy
alternatives); Grey, supra note 67, at 512 (noting “Justice Brandeis’s famous observation
about the states as laboratories for experimentation”); Long, supra note 64, at 56 (summarizing “laboratories of democracy” rationale for independent judicial interpretation of
state constitutions); Rich & White, supra note 47, at 868 (“[S]tates have amply demonstrated an ability to come up with innovative new solutions and act as ‘laboratories of democracy’ in important social policy areas like health care.”). But see generally David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of Antipoverty Law,
157 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2008) (arguing that decentralized policymaking and “democratic
experimentalism” has failed to produce effective antipoverty law).
An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, 2005 Mass.
H.B. 4479, ch. 58, 2006 Mass. Acts, (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M (2007)); see
Christopher Lee, Massachusetts Begins Universal Health Care, WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at
A6 (“Massachusetts’s new grand experiment could become a model for major changes in
health care across the country—if it works.”); John E. McDonough, A Year Later, Healthcare Experiment Has Strong Vital Signs, BOSTON GLOBE, April 11, 2007; at A9; Kevin Sack,
With Health Care for Nearly All, Massachusetts Now Faces Costs, N.Y. TIMES, March 16, 2009, at
A1 (describing Massachusetts’s 2006 health reform law as “perhaps the boldest state
health care experiment” and noting that “[w]ith Washington watching, the state’s leaders
are again blazing new trails” with cost-containment efforts); see also Elizabeth A. Weeks,
Failure to Connect: The Massachusetts Plan for Individual Health Insurance, 55 U. KAN. L. REV.
1283, 1284–94 (2007) (outlining the Massachusetts plan); Robert Steinbrook, Health Care
Reform in Massachusetts—Expanding Coverage, Escalating Costs, 385 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2757,
2757 (2008) (detailing the Massachusetts plan).
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75

adapt. President Obama’s campaign proposals and congressional
proposals included key components of the Massachusetts health
76
77
reform initiatives, as does the recently enacted federal statute. Especially on controversial issues, it may be beneficial to allow public
sentiment and judicial deliberation slowly to percolate up from the
states, rather than rushing a broad, federal pronouncement that may
78
generate backlash or ill-fitting solutions.
Arguments in favor of a federal approach to health reform include uniformity, universality, portability, comprehensiveness, and
79
fiscal viability. If health care is a right, or at least a significant public
concern, it may be important that all citizens receive the same core

75

76

77

78

79

Associated Press, Arnold’s Health Plan to Stir Debate, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, at A3; Jim
Carlton, Schwarzenegger Embarks on Fight for Health Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2007, at A2
(noting that Massachusetts’s Republican governor “struck a bipartisan deal with his state’s
legislature last year”); Sonya Geis & Christopher Lee, Schwarzenegger Proposes Universal
Health Coverage, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2007, at A3; Lee, supra note 74 at A6 (“Gov. Arnold
Schwarzenegger (R) is pushing a similar plan in California, and other states are watching
closely.”); Sara Watson Arthurs, Health Plan Brings Praise, Concerns, TIMES-STANDARD (Eureka, Cal.), Jan. 10, 2007; All Things Considered: The Massachusetts Health Plan, and California’s (National Public Radio broadcast Jan. 10, 2007), available at 2007 WLNR 547932; see
Weeks, supra note 74, at 1299–1301 (comparing Massachusetts law and California proposal).
See Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate – An Affordable and Fair
Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1, 6 (2009) (noting that
Massachusetts is the only state to require individuals to obtain health insurance); Ceci
Connolly, Kennedy’s Health-Care Measure to Require Employers to Chip In, WASH. POST, May 29,
2009, at A3; Robert Pear, Sweeping Health Plan is Drafted by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2009, at A13 (describing key components of American Health Choices Act); Kevin Sack,
Massachusetts, Model for Universal Health Care, Sees Ups and Downs in Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May
28, 2009, at A19; Kevin Sack, One State’s Lesson on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, March 29, 2009,
at WK1, 4 (side-by-side comparison of Massachusetts Plan and Obama’s proposals).
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1501, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (individual mandate); id. §§ 1511–15 (employer mandate); id. § 1321 (state-based
Exchanges).
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy
encompasses a woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy but that a state may have compelling justifications for limiting the right); Adam Liptak, Gay Vows, Repeated from State to
State, N.Y. TIMES, April 12, 2009, at WK1 (suggesting that state-by-state recognition of
same-sex marriage rights may be preferable a to U.S. Supreme Court decision because
the Court’s previous “decisions on issues like school desegregation, abortion and samesex marriage can raise questions about the judicial branch usurping the democratic
process,” shut down developments in state law, and generate lasting backlash).
Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 61, at 118 (listing desirable federal standards for health
reform); Rich & White, supra note 47, at 867 (“[T]he federal government can ensure equity through uniform national standards.”); see also Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E.
Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation:
The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 598–99 (2008) (discussing uniformity).
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80

package of services. Federal legislation and enforcement can effect
81
uniform standards. Moreover, federal benefits are portable, allowing people to move from state to state without losing or having to
82
change their health care benefits. The federal government may also
have greater administrative capacity and financial resources than
83
states to implement broad social policies. To the extent that health
reform requires subsidies or redistribution of resources, the federal
84
government can achieve that objective on a national scale.
Federal programs also might avoid race-to-the-bottom and in85
migration problems that could occur at the state level. The race-tothe-bottom argument suggests that if one state offers generous gov80

81
82

83

84

85

Kinney, supra note 50, at 857 (“This lack of uniformity [in Medicaid] may arguably be
undesirable from an equity perspective but it follows inevitably from Congress’s decision
to . . . give[] states great authority to structure programs within federal constraints.”); Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 61, at 119 (“Citizens and resident aliens are the proper beneficiaries of guaranteed health insurance and no good case exists for permitting variation
in this national standard.”); Stephen Utz, Federalism in Health Care: Costs and Benefits, 28
CONN. L. REV. 127, 132 (1995) (advocating that federal programs should be applied no
matter how individual states’ health programs may differ).
See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1304 (defining “Qualified Health
Plans”).
See Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 61, at 123 (suggesting that the “obvious solution” to
individuals having to change insurers when they move is “a national requirement that
states recognize the terms of other states’ health insurance programs”).
Jacobson, supra note 68, at xv (“Resource availability also favors federal implementation.”); Rich & White, supra note 47, at 867 (“The first is that the federal government has
superior administrative capacity and greater will to implement social policy than the
states.”); Super, supra note 73, at 558 (“To the extent that state and local governments
lack the resources to fund important activities, democratic experimentalism assumes
Congress will fund them to pursue broadly defined purposes.”).
Rich & White, supra note 47, at 867 (“[F]ederal government can redistribute resources on
a national basis, whereas the states . . . are limited to internal redistribution.”); Super, supra note 73, at 577 (“Decentralization imposes the burden of redistributing to low-income
people on narrow segments of society . . . .”).
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 509–10 (1999) (“The Solicitor General also suggests
that . . . ‘States might engage in a “race to the bottom” in setting the benefit levels in their
[welfare] programs.’”) (citation omitted); Charles Barrilleaux & Paul Brace, Notes from the
Laboratories of Democracy: State Government Enactments of Market- and State-Based Health Insurance Reforms in the 1990s, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 655, 670 (2007) (“[S]tates may engage in a race to the bottom in which they compete with their neighbors to provide the
least generous benefits.”); Dennis C. Mueller, Federalist Governments and Trumps, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1419, 1426 (1997) (describing “welfare effects of mobility across communities”); Jonathan Rodden & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV.
1521, 1549 (1997) (“Interjurisdictional competition . . . provides incentives for subnational units to produce externalities that favor local businesses and citizens and export
costs onto others.”); Super, supra note 73, at 557 (suggesting that arguments in favor of
democratic experimentalism assume the absence of factors such as “externalities from
one state or locality’s actions that affect another state or locality”); cf. Glicksman & Levy,
supra note 79, at 597–98 (describing race to the bottom concern with state environmental
regulation).
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ernment benefits while neighboring states do not, people may be
86
tempted to move to the more generous state. As more people move,
87
the generous states’ costs rise. The negative incentive, then, is for
the state to offer minimal government benefits in the first instance,
thereby avoiding the undesired in-migration and increased cost bur88
dens. The concern is exacerbated because federal Equal Protection
prohibits states from imposing durational residency requirements for
89
government benefits. Those economic incentive arguments against
state benefits should not be given undue weight, however, as various
sources rebut the “welfare magnet” notion that people move simply
to obtain government services. In fact, those most in need of gov90
ernment assistance may be the least able to relocate.
86

As the Court recognized in Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, considering a state law denying public hospital care to new immigrants:
A person afflicted with a serious respiratory ailment, particularly an indigent
whose efforts to provide a living for his family have been inhibited by his incapacitating illness, might well think of migrating to the clean dry air of Arizona,
where relief from his disease could also bring relief from unemployment and poverty. But he may hesitate if he knows that he must make the move without the
possibility of falling back on the State for medical care should his condition still
plague him or grow more severe during his first year of residence.

87

88

89

90

415 U.S. 250, 257 (1974).
See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506 (“California has instead advanced an entirely fiscal justification
for its multitiered scheme. . . . [which] will save the State approximately $10.9 million a
year.”); Mueller, supra note 85, at 1426 (discussing example of better schools and noting
that the family that moves “may impose further costs on the community it enters by overcrowding its schools”).
See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 228 (1982) (recognizing that “a State might have an
interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic effects of sudden shifts in population”); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (noting that the state’s justification for
a waiting period was that if “people can be deterred from entering the jurisdiction by denying them welfare benefits during the first year, state programs to assist long-time residents will not be impaired by a substantial influx of indigent newcomers”).
See, e.g., Saenz, 526 U.S. at 510–11 (holding that California durational residency requirement for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) benefits violated Fourteenth
Amendment right to travel); Mem’l Hosp., 415 U.S. at 269 (Arizona one-year residency requirement for free medical care to indigents violated Equal Protection and right to travel); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641–42 (one-year residency requirement for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) violated Equal Protection).
See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506 (“[A]lthough it is reasonable to assume that some persons may
be motivated to move for the purpose of obtaining higher benefits, the empirical evidence reviewed by the District Judge, which takes into account the high cost of living in
California, indicates that the number of such persons is quite small . . . .”); Scott W. Allard & Sheldon Danziger, Welfare Magnets: Myth or Reality?, 62 J. POL. 350, 363 (2000)
(concluding that single parents do not move frequently, and when they do it is for reasons other than taking advantage of a state’s welfare benefits); F.H. Buckley & Margaret F.
Brinig, Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 141, 162 (1997) (concluding that moving costs alone cannot explain the existence of payout differentials
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In sum, the U.S. Constitution, in text, purpose, structure, and policy provides little support for a federal health care right. If any right
to health exists, it would be more suitable to state constitutions. The
next Part provides a comprehensive survey of relevant state constitutional provisions on health and judicial decisions construing those
terms.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON HEALTH
This Part surveys state constitutions that expressly refer to health
and case law relying on those provisions. Thirteen state constitutions
91
specifically mention health. Six of those provisions have been judi92
cially interpreted. Another state’s constitutional provision on “beneficent provision” for the needy has been interpreted to encompass
93
health care. One additional state judicially recognizes health care as
a fundamental value, despite the absence of express constitutional
94
reference.
A. Overview of State Constitutional Provisions
The year of adoption for state constitutional provisions on health
95
varies widely. The earliest provision dates back to 1869, along with
two others enacted in the late 1800s. The last two states admitted to
the Union, Alaska and Hawaii, have constitutional provisions on
health. Alaska’s, adopted in 1956, pre-dates its statehood by three
years. Hawaii’s is the most recently adopted, in 1978. Six others date
to the 1970s. One state’s constitutional amendments addressing
health were added in the late 1930s, at the time of progressive federal
reforms, including the Social Security Act, designed to promote re-

91

92
93

94
95

among the states); Super, supra note 73, at 582 (“[R]esearch is mixed [on whether individuals] respond to interstate differences in welfare policy . . . .”); cf. PAUL E. PETERSON &
MARK C. ROM, WELFARE MAGNETS: A NEW CASE FOR A NATIONAL STANDARD 82–83 (1990)
(noting that welfare policies may affect geographic residency choices in the long-term, if
not the short-term).
See ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 93.12; ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 4; ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 19;
HAW. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1, 3; ILL. CONST. pmbl.; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 8; MICH. CONST.
art. 4, § 51; MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86; MO. CONST. Art. 4, § 37; MONT. CONST. art II, § 3;
N.Y. CONST. art. 17, §§ 1, 3; S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 20.
See infra Part II.B.
N.C. CONST. art. XI § 4 (“Beneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate and the orphan is one of the first duties of a civilized and Christian state.”); see infra Part II.B.3 (discussing North Carolina case law).
See infra Part II.B.7 (discussing New Jersey cases).
See infra Appendix A (chart listing text of provisions and dates of adoption).
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96

covery after the Great Depression. Another state’s was adopted in
the early 1960s Great Society era, which brought federal programs to
address poverty and social injustice, including Medicare and Medica97
id.
The text of state constitutions reveals certain trends. Some consti98
tutions arguably create enforceable rights. Others merely recognize
health as an important value, public concern, or aspiration. Some
contain mandatory language that the state or, specifically, state legislature, “shall pass suitable laws” or “shall provide” for the health of
citizens. Other constitutions identify the state’s power or authority
over health but do not establish a duty. In addition to varying
strength of rights-creating language, state constitutions differ in their
inclusiveness. Some limit the right or duty to the indigent, insane, or
other vulnerable members of society. Other constitutions specify
types of services, such as public health or hospital care. All of the
provisions fall well short of a broad guarantee of health.
B. Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions
Judicial interpretation of the relevant provisions is relatively thin.
Most cases rely on the constitutional provisions pertaining to health
indirectly to support a conclusion on a different question. When
state courts have enforced the provisions, the holdings have been deliberately narrow. State courts seem to draw careful lines to avoid recognizing broad, enforceable rights to health.
1. Michigan
Michigan is a useful starting point because it has seen the most direct attempt to enforce a right to health care. Article 1, section 51 of
Michigan’s Constitution provides: “The public health and general
welfare of the people of the state are hereby declared to be matters of
primary public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws for

96

97

98

PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 266–70 (1982) (describing history of Social Security Act); Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”:
The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 899, 912–20 (1990) (describing the New Deal welfare reforms).
STARR, supra note 96, at 367–74 (describing Great Society programs and Medicare and
Medicaid enactment); Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1710–18 (1993) (describing Great Society
programs and aftermath).
See infra Appendix B (chart summarizing similarities and differences in the text of state
constitutional provisions).
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99

the protection and promotion of the public health.” The first sentence is largely aspirational, expressing a shared value and concern
100
for health as a primary responsibility of the state. By its terms, the
constitution recognizes “public health” and “general welfare,” not individual rights. The second sentence uses mandatory language, requiring the legislature to pass public health laws.
101
In Michigan Universal Health Care Action Network v. State, various
advocacy groups brought a class action on behalf of uninsured and
underinsured residents, seeking a declaratory judgment that Article
1, section 51 requires the legislature to establish a state-wide health
102
care plan.
The court of appeals’ brief, unreported opinion af103
firmed the trial court’s dismissal for lack of standing. The appeals
court noted that section 51 is not self-executing and merely empow104
ers the legislature to enact laws. Despite the mandatory language in
the second sentence, the court concluded that the provision did not
105
“require the state to provide state-funded health care coverage.”
Accordingly, the plaintiffs could not show the requisite “causal connection between the State’s alleged failure to comply with the constitution by enacting a health care plan and the plaintiff’s injuries, alle106
gedly caused by their lack of health coverage.”
The case was
dismissed without reaching the merits.
The few other Michigan cases referring to section 51 involved
malpractice or negligence suits against state or county health care facilities. The defendants claimed governmental immunity. In two of
107
the cases, patients themselves were injured by hospital staff. In the
third case, a third-party in the community was injured by an inpatient
108
on a grounds pass. In all three cases, the courts held that the hospital entities and employees were immune from liability, noting that

99
100

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

108

MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 51 (2009).
See Gary A. Benjamin & Shaakirrah R. Sanders, Michigan’s Duty to Provide Access to Health
Care, 6 J.L. SOC’Y. 1, 13 (2005) (“[A]t the very least, it means that health care is a governmental function.”).
No. 261400, 2005 WL 3116595 (Mich. App. 2005).
Id. at *1; see Benjamin & Shaakirrah, supra note 100, at 32–33 (discussing case background, with appellate review pending).
Mich. Universal, 2005 WL 3116595, at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Perry v. Kalamazoo State Hosp., 273 N.W.2d 421 (Mich. 1978) (patient was placed in restraints and asphyxiated on his own vomit); Coen v. Oakland County, 400 N.W.2d 614
(Mich. 1986) (patient was allegedly injured by prescription drugs).
Hamilton v. Reynolds, 341 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 1983) (woman was killed in her home by
patient released on grounds pass).
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they were acting “in furtherance of the state’s constitutional mandate
109
to protect and promote public health.” With respect to enforceable
health rights, the decisions give with one hand and take away with the
other. They first acknowledged the state’s duty to provide care and
treatment but then held the governmental actors immune for failing
110
to properly carry out the duty.
The relevance of the constitution
was merely to establish that the defendants were carrying out a public
function. As interpreted by Michigan courts, Article 1, section 51
does not create and, in fact, seems to negate, any enforceable claim
with respect to state action or inaction.
2. New York
Another promising venue for constitutional protection of health is
New York, which has been widely acknowledged as a bastion of social
111
and economic rights. Two constitutional provisions could be interpreted as establishing health rights. First, the “Aid to the Needy Provision,” Article 17, section 1: “The aid, care, and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such
of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the leg112
islature may from time to time determine.”
Second, the “Public
Health Provision,” Article 17, section 3: “The protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public
concern and provision therefore shall be made by the state and by
such of its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as
113
the legislature shall from time to time determine.” The provisions
identify “aid, care, and support” and “health” as matters of “public
concern.” Both provisions use mandatory “shall” language but ac109
110

111

112
113

Id. at 154 (citing section 51); see also Coen, 400 N.W.2d at 615–16 (citing section 51); Perry,
273 N.W.2d at 423 n.4 (quoting section 51);
In Perry, the claim was framed as a breach of the defendant hospital’s “duty to provide for
the care, treatment and custody of its patients.” 273 N.W.2d at 422 n.1. Coen noted that
“the provision of mental health services . . . involves an activity impliedly mandated by the
state constitution.” 400 N.W.2d at 615.
See TARR, supra note 63, at 149 (suggesting that New York “pioneered” state efforts,
“committing itself explicitly to providing for the social welfare of its residents”); Williams,
supra note 17, at 25 (citing New York’s Constitutional provisions as examples of positive
rights); Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1144–45 (citing the New York Constitution as an example of a mandatory obligation on the state); Alan Jenkins & Sabrineh Ardalann, Positive
Health: The Human Right to Health Care Under the New York State Constitution, 35 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 479, 483 (2008) (“New York’s Constitution is particularly protective of [education, shelter, and health care] rights.”); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 13–14 (describing New
York as “exemplary” of state “constitutional declaration of social and economic rights”).
N.Y. CONST. art. 17, § 1 (2006).
Id. § 3.
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cord discretion to the legislature to determine “in such manner and
by such means” to provide state assistance.
In 1938, New York adopted five amendments, including the Aid to
the Needy and Public Health Provisions, expressly recognizing welfare needs of citizens as matters of public concern. Other amendments addressed care and treatment for persons with mental ill114
115
nesses and housing for low-income citizens.
The Public Health
Provision aimed primarily at public health and hygiene concerns of
the era, such as sanitation and vaccination. But reports from the
Constitutional Convention suggest that lawmakers also discussed important, then-recent medical advances and the eventual need for uni116
versal health care. Despite those aspirational beginnings, the New
York constitutional provisions have not supported broad claims to
health rights.
There is little, relevant case law on the Public Health provision.
Most cases merely recognize local public health departments’ author117
ity to promulgate rules and regulations.
When plaintiffs have asserted individual claims under the Public Health Provision, courts
118
have side-stepped the question. For example, in Hope v. Perales,
plaintiffs charged that a state parental assistance program that did
not cover abortions as medical services violated the Public Health
119
Provision. The court held that the parental assistance program was
not aimed at protecting the public’s health; therefore, the Public
114

115

116

117
118
119

Id. § 4 (“The care and treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder or defect and
the protection of the mental health of the inhabitants of the state may be provided by
state and local authorities and in such manner as the legislature may from time to time
determine.”).
N.Y. CONST. art. 18, § 1 (2006) (“Subject to the provisions of this article, the legislature
may provide in such manner, by such means and upon such terms and conditions as it
may prescribe for low rent housing and nursing home accommodations for persons of
low income as defined by law . . . .”).
See Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of our Times: State Constitutions and International Human
Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 392 (2006); Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolution and State Constitutions, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403, 1415–25 (1999) (discussing history
of Article XVII); Jenkins & Ardalann, supra note 111, at 483–95 (discussing history of
amendments); see also STARR, supra note 96, at 182–89 (describing New York’s early public
health interventions); Beatrix Hoffman, Health Care Reform and Social Movements in the
United States, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 75, 75–85 (2003); R.L. Duffus, Shall Medicine Be Socialized? A Big Issue Is Joined, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1932, at XX7; S.J. Duncan-Clark, Editorial,
Doctors and Laity in Row over Health, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1929, at 1 (“The mounting cost of
medical care has become a most serious problem for many persons of moderate
means.”).
See, e.g., Conlon v. Marshall, 59 N.Y.S.2d 52, 55–56 (1945) (regarding New York City tuberculosis regulation).
634 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1994).
Id. at 188.
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Health Provision was inapplicable. Similarly, in Aliessa v. Novello,
the court declined to rely on the Public Health Provision to uphold a
challenge to the state’s denial of Medicaid to undocumented immigrants. The court instead recognized a duty to provide Medicaid
benefits to the plaintiffs based on the Aid to the Needy Provision.
The Aliessa court cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Me122
morial Hospital v. Maricopa County, which identified health care as a
123
“basic necessity of life.” Maricopa struck down a state durational residency requirement for publicly funded nonemergency hospitalization or medical care as violating the constitutional right of interstate
124
travel by denying newcomers the “basic necessities of life.” The key
point in both Aliessa and Maricopa was that state benefits must be
available equally to both newly-arrived and longer-term residents.
But the cases do not recognize any baseline right to state-provided
medical care.
The Aid to the Needy Provision, while not expressly mentioning
“health,” has been more vigorously interpreted to create affirmative
125
rights. The New York court noted: “In view of this legislative history, as well as the mandatory language of the provision itself, it is clear
that section 1 of article XVII imposes upon the State an affirmative
126
duty to aid the needy.” In the Medicaid case, Aliessa, the New York
court held that denying medical assistance based on criteria other
than need, namely, immigration status, violated the letter and spirit
127
of the Aid to the Needy Provision. The court emphasized that “care
120
121
122

123
124

125

126
127

Id.
754 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 n.12 (N.Y. 2001).
See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 269 (1974) (“The Arizona durational
residence requirement for eligibility for nonemergency free medical care creates an ‘invidious classification’ that impinges on the right of interstate travel by denying newcomers ‘basic necessities of life.’”).
See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1093 (quoting Maricopa, 415 U.S. at 259–61).
Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 259 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969))
(striking durational residency requirement on welfare benefits); DEP’T. OF HEALTH,
EDUC., AND WELFARE SUBMISSION TO THE H. COMM. ON WAY AND MEANS, 86TH CONG.,
REPORT ON MEDICAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
RECIPIENTS 74 (Comm. Print 1961).
See, e.g., McCain v. Koch, 511 N.E.2d 62, 62–63 (N.Y. 1987) (upholding injunction against
New York City emergency homeless shelter to maintain minimum standards); Tucker v.
Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451–53 (N.Y. 1977) (finding affirmative state duty to provide home
relief benefits to minor children living alone); Wilkins v. Perales, 487 N.Y.S.2d 961, 964
(Sup. Ct. 1985) (recognizing an Aid to the Needy provision as an individually enforceable
fundamental right); Hershkoff, supra note 116, at 1425 (discussing individually enforceable right to welfare under New York Constitution).
Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 452.
See Aliessa, 754 N.E.2d at 1098–99 (“We hold that section 122 violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and the New York State Constitutions insofar as it denies
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for the needy is not a matter of ‘legislative grace,’ it is a constitutional
128
Even while recognizing a constitutional duty on the
mandate.”
state, the New York court stopped short of telling the state legislature
129
how to carry out its duty, allowing considerable discretion to define
the scope of its obligations and flexibility to adapt to changing cir130
cumstances. The New York Court of Appeals was similarly hesitant
to spell out the contours of the state’s duty to provide mental health
131
treatment under that constitutional provision.
Despite some expectation that New York would recognize a broad,
constitutional right to health, judicial interpretation of the 1938
amendments is more equivocal. New York courts declined the opportunity to recognize enforceable rights under the Public Health
provision. Courts do recognize an affirmative duty under the Aid to
the Needy provision but will not tell the legislature how to carry out
the duty.
3. North Carolina
Similar to New York’s Aid to the Needy provision, the North Carolina Constitution does not expressly mention health, but a provision
on welfare has been the basis of several claims involving medical
treatment. Article XI, section 4, provides: “Beneficent provision for
the poor, the unfortunate, and the orphan is one of the first duties of
a civilized and Christian state. Therefore the General Assembly shall
132
provide for and define the duties of a board of public welfare.” The

128
129

130
131

132

State Medicaid to otherwise eligible [New York residents] lawfully admitted . . . based on
their status as aliens.”).
Id. at 1092; see also Lovelace v. Gross, 605 N.E.2d 339, 342 (N.Y. 1992) (noting “that the
Legislature may not refuse to aid the needy”) (citing Tucker, 371 N.E.2d, at 452–53).
See Lovelace, 605 N.E.2d at 342 (noting that the New York “Constitution vests the Legislature with discretion ‘in determining the amount of aid, and in classifying recipients and
defining the term ‘needy’’”) (quoting Tucker, 371 N.E.2d at 452).
See Hershkoff, supra note 116, at 1427–28 (describing how an amendment to the New
York state Constitution afforded the state broad power to meet the needs of the poor).
The court recognized minors’ due process right to treatment as a consequence
of being deprived of their liberty by being placed in state training facilities but
declined to address the adequacy of the treatment. Specifically, in Lavette v.
City of New York, the court stated:
We are frank to acknowledge the practical limitations upon the power of courts to
determine the adequacy and effectiveness of treatment afforded [minors in need
of state supervision]. By what yardstick shall we measure? Surely the role of formulating criteria to measure the effectiveness of treatment facilities is not and
should not be an exclusively judicial function.
316 N.E.2d 314, 317 (N.Y. 1974).
N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 4.
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provision expressly declares a state duty but limited to the “poor” and
133
“unfortunate.”
An early North Carolina Supreme Court decision clearly turned
on the indigent status of the patient. State Hospital at Raleigh v. Security National Bank involved a hospital collections action against the
134
guardian of a deceased patient. The patient, a U.S. Army veteran,
135
was both insane and indigent when admitted to the hospital. During his stay, the patient became eligible for Veterans’ Bureau financial assistance, sufficient to cover the cost of care that he had re136
ceived. The patient’s guardian claimed that the Veterans’ Benefits
were exempt from any and all creditors and, therefore, the hospital
could not collect. The Supreme Court of North Carolina observed
that, “[t]he Constitution of North Carolina empowers the General
Assembly to provide that indigent insane persons shall be cared for at
137
the charge of the state.” The court then noted that nothing in the
constitution required or authorized the legislature “to provide for the
care, treatment, or maintenance of nonindigent insane persons at the
138
expense of the state.”
Accordingly, once the patient became non139
indigent, he had no further right to state-provided care.
North Carolina affirmed that approach in Graham v. Reserve Life
140
Insurance Co., holding that a state-operated tuberculosis sanatorium
could collect payment from a nonindigent’s health and accident in141
surance policy.
Rejecting the patient’s argument that providing
free tuberculosis treatment to the indigent, while collecting payment
133
134

135

136
137

138
139

140
141

Id.
178 S.E. 487, 488 (N.C. 1935) (“This is an action to recover [from] the defendant the entire cost of the care, treatment, and maintenance of its ward . . . from the date of his admission as a patient in the State Hospital at Raleigh until the commencement of this action.”).
Id. (noting that “Earl N. Betts was an indigent person, without funds or property with
which to pay for his support and treatment in said Hospital” and that he received compensation from the Veteran’s Bureau of the United States).
See id. (indicating that he had been awarded compensation by the Veteran’s Bureau of
the United States).
Id. at 491; see N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XI, § 10 (1868) (“The General Assembly shall provide that all deaf mutes, the blind, and the insane of the State, shall be cared for at the
charge of the State.”); see also John L. Sanders, Our Constitutions: A Historical Perspective,
The North Carolina Constitution, State Library of North Carolina (summarizing the history
of North Carolina’s constitutional conventions and amendments), available at
http://statelibrary.ncdcr.gov/nc/STGOVT/PRECONST.HTM (last visited May 6, 2010).
State Hosp. at Raleigh, 178 S.E. at 491.
See id. at 492 (“When he became a nonindigent patient of the hospital, he had no further
right to its care, treatment, and maintenance at the expense of the state, because he had
been admitted to the hospital as an indigent patient.”).
See 161 S.E.2d 485, 491 (S.C. 1968) (finding the plaintiff himself liable to the hospital).
See id. (“[D]efendant is liable to plaintiff for the sum of $600.00, the policy limit.”).
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at varying rates from the nonindigent and insured, violated equal
protection, the court noted:
Germs attack both the affluent and the indigent. Therefore, in order to
protect all its citizens, the State must—in the first instance, at least— provide treatment without cost to the indigent. It does not follow, however,
that it must also furnish free treatment to those who are able to pay or
who have had the forethought to purchase insurance to cover the cost of
142
hospitalization.

The state’s decision to allocate scarce resources to the indigent, while
collecting payment from those who can afford to pay, did not operate
143
as unconstitutional discrimination.
Two more recent decisions likewise narrowly define the constitutional duty. First, Casey v. Wake County considered whether a county
health department family planning clinic was a governmental actor
144
entitled to sovereign immunity.
The personal injury action was
brought by a sixteen-year-old plaintiff who developed complications
from insertion of an intrauterine device. In upholding the health
department’s immunity claim, the court cited Article XI, section 4,
noting that “our State Constitution mandates care for those in need
145
as a duty of the State.” The duty may be delegated to counties and
local boards of health, authorized by statute to make rules and regulations “not inconsistent with law, as are necessary to protect and ad146
vance the public health.” The county family planning clinic, under
such delegation, provided services “to all women, whether they can
147
148
pay or not” and as “a benefit to the general populous,” consistent
with the state’s duty to provide for the “health and welfare of the citi149
zens of the county.” Distributing free family planning and contraceptives, therefore, was a governmental function for which the hos150
pital was entitled to immunity. The decision did not explicitly turn
on the plaintiff’s lack of ability to pay or otherwise limit the definition
of “need” to financial status. References to the “general populous”
142
143

144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
See id. (“It seems entirely unnecessary to say that the law makes no unconstitutional discrimination between classes when it charges all tubercular patients the same rate but actually collects from only those who can pay.”).
See 263 S.E.2d 360, 361 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) (setting forth the main issue to be decided
in the case).
Id.
Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130-17(b)(1983)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 362 (indicating that the hospital is entitled to governmental immunity for these
actions).
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and suggestion of a duty “to all women” could be read to support a
broader duty, not limited to the indigent. But there is no case law
supporting that interpretation.
Craven County Hospital Corp. v. Lenoir County suggests that North
151
Carolina courts likely would not accept the broader reading.
Craven County involved an action by a private hospital against a city,
county, and sheriff’s department to recover costs of medical care provided to an indigent, intoxicated person injured while in police custody. As a threshold matter, the court clarified that the intoxicated
man was not under arrest but had merely been detained by the she152
riff’s department, as authorized by statute, until he became sober.
The court also clarified that the patient’s injury resulted from his own
153
intoxicated state, not any conduct by the officers. Had the patient
been in police custody under arrest or conviction, the case would
likely have come out differently, with federal constitutional implica154
tions.
On the issues raised, the court considered the hospital’s constitutional claim that Article XI, section 4 imposed a duty to provide med155
ical care and, therefore, pay for the patient’s treatment. The court
noted that Article XI, section 4 makes clear that “care of the indigent
sick and afflicted poor is a proper function of the Government of this
156
State” and that the function may be delegated to local governments.
Carefully parsing the text, the court acknowledged that the state had
properly delegated the “duty to provide local public health services” to
counties but not the duty to provide hospital care or establish public
157
hospitals. Accordingly, the county had no duty to pay for hospital
care. Therefore, the hospital could not collect payment from the

151

152
153
154
155

156
157

See 331 S.E.2d 690, 693 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (“No duty is imposed by statute upon the
City [] to pay for medical services rendered to persons in the custody of its police officers;
therefore there is no relationship implied by law which would obligate the City to pay the
costs of such treatment.”).
See id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-65.13 (1983)) (describing the circumstances of the
patient’s detainment).
See id. at 693–94 (noting that the patient was not injured by the officers but rather as a
result of his intoxicated condition).
See infra notes 260–69 and accompanying text (explaining Eighth Amendment implications).
See Craven County, 331 S.E.2d at 694 (describing plaintiff’s allegation that “defendant City
has a constitutional obligation to provide necessary medical attention to those in the custody of its officers, including the obligation to pay for such treatment”).
Id. at 694 (citing Martin v. Comm’rs of Wake, 180 S.E. 777, 783 (N.C. 1935) (interpreting
North Carolina Constitution of 1868)).
Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
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county, city, or sheriffs’ department for the cost of the intoxicated pa158
tient’s care.
Craven County Hospital demonstrates the careful line that courts
draw in declining to recognize an affirmative right to state-funded
health care. The case specified that the patient was not under arrest
in police custody, which would have created a duty to provide medical care. The decision also distinguished sharply between “public
health” and “hospital care.” Moreover, the case recognized that the
state’s duty does not extend to governmental subunits absent clear
legislative delegation. The court seemed untroubled by the fact that
the private hospital would be left bearing the cost of care for an indigent patient delivered to its doors by government authorities. Had
the man wandered into the hospital on his own, the result presumably would have been the same: The hospital would have treated him
159
and been unable to collect payment.
4. Mississippi
Mississippi’s provision is one of the oldest on the books (adopted
in 1869), and thus could be a source of well-developed judicial interpretation. Article IV, section 86 provides: “It shall be the duty of the
legislature to provide by law for the treatment and care of the insane;
and the legislature may provide for the care of the indigent sick in
160
the hospitals in the State.”
The text is clear that the mandatory,
“shall provide” provision applies only to mental health care for “the
insane.” Otherwise, the state, seemingly in its discretion, “may provide” general hospital care to “the indigent sick.”
Consistent with the constitutional text, Mississippi courts have not
recognized a broad right to health care under Article IV, section 86.

158

159

160

See id. (finding that “no cause of action accrues in favor of a health care provider against a
county to recover for the cost of hospital services rendered to an indigent resident of the
county”).
Craven County pre-dates the federal patient “anti-dumping” law, the Emergency Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, enacted in 1986. Even had
EMTALA been in effect at the time of the decision, it would not create a right to treatment for the patient or right to payment for the hospital. EMTALA requires hospitals
that maintain emergency rooms and participate in the Medicare program to screen and
stabilize patients regardless of their ability to pay but does not prohibit hospitals from attempting to collect payment after the fact. See 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(b)(1) (2000); Medicare
Program; Clarifying Policies Related to the Responsibilities of Medicare-Participating
Hospitals in Treating Individuals with Emergency Medical Conditions, 68 Fed. Reg.
53,222 (Sept. 9, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 413, 482, 489) (summarizing
EMTALA requirements).
MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86.
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In Craig v. Mercy Hospital-Street Memorial, a hospital sought to compel
the state treasury to pay a requisitioned grant of state funds, which
161
would then be matched by federal grants. The State Attorney General deemed the hospital ineligible for the state grant on two
grounds: First, a state statute limited the federally matched grants to
non-profit entities. Second, a different constitutional provision, section 66, prohibited the state from giving any “donation or gratuity”
162
for “a sectarian purpose or use.”
The Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the Attorney General’s
first argument, concluding that the hospital was, in fact, a non-profit
163
organization.
On the second argument, the court acknowledged
that the hospital was religiously affiliated but noted that it operated
under a separate charter from the Sisters of Mercy and described itself as nonsectarian. Accordingly, the court held that the grant to the
hospital did not violate section 66. The court also noted that section
86 of the Mississippi Constitution creates an “obligation . . . though
164
not a mandatory duty” to provide hospital care for the indigent sick.
In carrying out that duty, the legislature could delegate to private ent165
ities, including those with religious affiliation.
A state “grant” to a
private entity carrying out the public purpose of providing indigent
hospital care would not be considered “a donation or gratuity” violat166
ing section 66.
Accordingly, the plaintiff-hospital was eligible for
the grant.
A more recent case considered the state’s constitutional duty to
provide care for the mentally ill. In Attorney General v. Interest of
167
B.C.M., the Mississippi Supreme Court considered whether a statute
authorizing the facility director to refuse admission under certain cir168
cumstances violated section 86. The case involved a minor who was
court-ordered for treatment at a local hospital. The director of the

161
162
163
164
165

166
167

168

See Craig v. Mercy Hosp. 45 So.2d 809, 810 (Miss. 1950) (discussing the hospital’s filing of
a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the state treasury to pay the funds).
Id. at 810–11 (citing MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 66).
See id. at 814 (noting that the Commission on Hospital Care and the trial court established that the hospital qualified as a non-profit institution).
Id. at 817–18.
See id. at 818 (suggesting that a state may bestow a grant on a private, religiously-affiliated
entity to assist in the carrying out of a public duty so long as the grant is was not used for
sectarian purposes).
Id. at 822.
See B.C.M., 744 So.2d 299, 299 (Miss. 1999) (considering whether conditioning judiciallyordered mental treatment on the availability of facilities and services is constitutional under state law).
See id. at 299–300 (citing MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86) (“It shall be the duty of the legislature
to provide by law for the treatment and care of the insane . . . .”).
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hospital refused to admit the patient, citing lack of space. The court
noted that the state’s “duty to care for the mentally ill is constitutionally mandated” but, as in Craig, allowed the state to delegate the pub169
lic function to particular health care providers. While the “Constitution mandates that the Legislature provide for the care of the
insane, it places no restrictions on how the Legislature may allot that
170
duty . . . .” The Court concluded that the state fulfilled its constitutional duty by requiring the admitting institution to assume at least
temporary responsibility for court-ordered patients, even if it lacks fa171
cilities to immediately admit patients for longer-term treatment.
The refusal-to-admit provision, therefore, was constitutional.
The two reported Mississippi cases construing article IV, section
86 offer scant support for a general right to health care. At most,
Craig clarifies that the state-provided hospital care for indigent patients is discretionary and can be delegated to private, religiouslyaffiliated entities. B.C.M. recognizes the state’s mandatory duty to
care for the insane but also allows that responsibility to be delegated.
In addition, by upholding the statutory allowance for an institution to
refuse admission based on lack of space, the B.C.M. court implicitly
recognized pragmatic resource limits on the constitutional duty. Although the state “must” provide care, the duty can be satisfied by
providing only temporary detention of patients.
5. South Carolina
South Carolina’s provision is similar to Michigan’s and New York’s
in expressly recognizing health as a public concern and creating a
mandatory duty on the legislature. Article XII, section 1 provides:
The health, welfare, and safety of the lives and property of the people of
this State and the conservation of its natural resources are matters of
public concern. The General Assembly shall provide appropriate agencies to function in these areas of public concern and determine the activ172
ities, powers, and duties of such agencies.

There are no South Carolina cases interpreting the current provision,
adopted in 1971, and case law on earlier versions is very limited. Al169
170
171

172

Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 303 (citation omitted).
Id. at 303 (“[T]he Mississippi Constitution clearly provides that the Legislature is to care
for the insane. The Legislature has done so by . . . requir[ing] the director of the admitting facility to assume the responsibility of providing treatment and care for mentally ill
minors even if they are not immediately admitted to the facility as soon as they are committed by the lower court.”)
S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
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though the current text does not limit any state duty to mental health
as opposed to general medical care, the constitution and courts historically made that distinction.
173
A 1941 South Carolina Supreme Court case, Crouch v. Benet, involved a taxpayer petition to enjoin a state loan to a hospital and
174
training center for the mentally ill. The court noted the state’s long
history of providing care for “the unfortunate,” dating back to 1822,
with “probably the oldest building now standing in the United States
175
built by a State for the insane.” The court cited an earlier version of
Article XII, section 1, which provided that “[i]nstitutions for the care
of the insane . . . and poor shall always be fostered and supported by
176
this State,” which the court deemed both “a wise provision of law”
177
and “long established public policy.” Accordingly, the court recognized the state’s role in assisting “helpless members of society who
because of mental infirmities cannot care for themselves” as a
178
“mandate of the Constitution of the State.”
State loans to the defendant hospital comported with that duty, and the taxpayer’s chal179
lenge was rejected.
Crouch hardly stands as a judicial declaration of an individual right
to health care, providing merely that “appropriation[s] shall be made
as often as may be necessary to carry out [the purpose of Article XII,
180
section 1].” Also, the court limited the state’s duty to care for the
mentally ill, even though the constitutional provision referred to
181
“helpless members of society” more broadly.
6. Montana
Montana’s 1972 constitution contains an express “inalienable
rights” provision that includes “health,” suggesting a promising venue
for clear judicial recognition. Article II, section 3, provides:

173

174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

See 17 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 1941) (describing a proceeding to test the constitutionality of a
hospital issuing certificates of indebtedness to the state under a certain South Carolina
Act where the funds obtained by the hospital would be used to provide additional facilities and buildings).
See id. at 321, 324 (discussing taxpayer efforts to prevent the state from providing these
funds to the hospital).
Id. at 323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 323–24.
Id. at 323.
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All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment and the rights of
pursuing life’s basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and
liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking their
182
safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways.

Despite the robust language, close reading and judicial interpretation
of the provision limits Article II, section 3 to negative rights to be free
from governmental interference, not affirmative rights to government services. Specifically, “[a]ll persons” have “inalienable rights” to
“seek[] their . . . health . . . in all lawful ways.” In other words, the
state is prohibited from interfering with an individual’s lawful pursuit
of health but does not have to provide health care to individuals. For
the most part, Montana case law has consistently restricted the provision to that interpretation.
For example, a recent Montana Supreme Court opinion, Simms v.
Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court, relied on Article II, section 3
183
in deciding a procedural issue in a medical malpractice case. The
issue was whether the trial court exercised proper supervisory control
over the litigation by ordering the plaintiff-patient to undergo an invasive independent medical evaluation in Oregon at the defendanthospital’s request. The Montana Supreme Court held that the trial
court abused its discretion in ordering the examination, noting:
“When a proposed examination risks unnecessary, painful or harmful
184
procedures, the scale must favor protecting individual rights.” Accordingly, the state, or trial court judges, cannot compel individuals
to submit to unnecessary medical examinations. Simms identifies
185
health as a fundamental right but hardly establishes an affirmative,
enforceable right to health care. At most, the decision recognizes the
negative right to be free from burdensome, painful intrusions on individual health and bodily integrity.
The Montana Supreme Court similarly recognized the inalienable
right to health as a negative right in other contexts. Armstrong v. State
struck down a statute providing that only physicians could lawfully
186
perform pre-viability abortions.
Non-physician health care provid182
183
184
185
186

MONT. CONST. art II, § 3 (1972).
See 68 P.3d 678, 682 (Mont. 2003) (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3, providing a right to
safety, health, and happiness, and § 10, affording a right to privacy).
Id., at 683.
See Id. at 685 (concluding that trial court abused its discretion, when considering the requested examination “in the context of Simms’ fundamental rights”).
See 989 P.2d 364, 384 (Mont. 1999) (striking down Montana’s statutory prohibition on
pre-viability abortions as unconstitutional in violation of individual privacy under Article
II, section 10, of the Montana Constitution).
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ers challenged the statute on state constitutional grounds. The decision turned primarily on Montana’s constitutional privacy provision,
187
But the court buttressed its holding, noting
Article II, section 10.
that:
Article II, section 3, guarantees each person the inalienable right to seek
safety, health and happiness in all lawful ways—i.e., in the context of this
case, the right to seek and obtain medical care from a chosen health care
provider and to make personal judgments affecting one’s own health and
188
bodily integrity without government interference.

The decision echoes Simms’s recognition of individual rights of
bodily integrity and medical decision making. Armstrong specified
that the fundamental right of privacy includes a “personal autonomy
component” that “broadly guarantees each individual the right to
make medical judgments affecting his or her bodily integrity and
health in partnership with a chosen health care provider free from
189
the interference of the government.”
Another recent case, In the Matter of C.R.O., sounds a similar note.
The Montana Supreme Court reversed a decision terminating parental rights of a father who was undergoing treatment for mental ill190
ness.
The majority declined to terminate parental rights, finding
the evidence lacking that the father’s condition was unlikely to
change within a reasonable time, which would allow him to assume
191
the role of parent. The holding did not turn on Article II, section
3. But Justice Nelson in dissent noted that “the Court’s decision
trammels the inalienable constitutional rights of [the child] to pursue life’s basic necessities, to enjoy a safe, healthy, and happy life” and
“basic human dignity,” presumably through adoption or foster care in
192
a “permanent, stable and loving family.” Justice Nelson’s passionate
dissent, reminiscent of Justice Blackmun in DeShaney, concluded:
“Once again, the biological parent wins a court case and the child

187

188
189
190
191

192

See MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The right of individual privacy is essential to the wellbeing of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling
state interest.”).
Armstrong, 989 P.2d at 383.
Id. at 384.
See 43 P.3d 913, 919 (Mont. 2002) (reversing the lower court’s decision).
See id. at 919 (“We hold that substantial evidence does not exist to support the District
Court’s finding that [the doctor] believed that the condition preventing [the father]
from assuming the role of parent is unlikely to change within a reasonable time.”).
Id. at 921 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3); id. at 922 (paraphrasing same).
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loses a shot at a decent life. How sad. Indeed, how tragic.”
Certainly, the constitutional provision played no role in the majority’s
decision to uphold parental rights. But C.R.O. suggests that at least
one justice would give constitutional weight to certain basic necessities, including health. Moreover, Justice Nelson seemed willing to
recognize the need for affirmative state action, such as, removing the
child from parental custody, in order to protect the inalienable
health right.
Even more revealing of Montana’s strong preference for negative
rights is its willingness to imply certain fundamental rights, bootstrapping from the express inalienable rights provision. Wadsworth v.
State involved a state worker’s claim for wrongful termination under a
194
regulation that prohibited state employees from moonlighting.
The court held that the anti-moonlighting law violated the plaintiff’s
fundamental right to pursue employment under Article II, section 3.
The court quoted the inalienable rights provision and acknowledged
195
that employment was not one of the enumerated rights.
[N]evertheless, we have held a right may be ‘fundamental’ under Montana’s constitution if the right is either found in the Declaration of Rights
or is a right ‘without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights
would have little meaning.’ The inalienable right to pursue life’s basic
necessities is stated in the Declaration of Rights and is therefore a fun196
damental right.

The court further noted that employment enables the worker to obtain “the most basic of life’s necessities, such as food, clothing, and
shelter” and “other essentials of modern life, including health and med197
ical insurance, retirement, and day care.” Having concluded that Article II, section 3, contains an implied fundamental right to employment, the court then applied strict scrutiny, requiring “the State [to]
show a compelling state interest” and that the “legislative action is the

193

194

195

196
197

Id. at 922; see also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213
(1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (exclaiming, “Poor Joshua!” and noting that as a result
of the Court holding no constitutional duty to protect the child from his father’s abuse,
“this child, Joshua DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life profoundly retarded”).
See 911 P.2d 1165, 1171 (Mont. 1996) (discussing the worker’s claim that “the conflict-ofinterest rule unconstitutionally infringed upon his fundamental right to the opportunity
to pursue employment.”).
See id. at 1172 (“While not specifically enumerated in the terms of Article II, section
3 . . . the opportunity to pursue employment is, nonetheless, necessary to enjoy the right
to pursue life’s basic necessities.”).
Id. at 1172 (citation omitted).
Id. (emphasis added).
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least onerous path that can be taken to achieve the state objective.”
The state failed to meet that burden; therefore, the plaintiff was
199
Wadsworth recognizes only a negative right
wrongfully discharged.
to be free from government intrusion in the lawful pursuit of employment as a means to obtaining health insurance, not a positive
right to government-provided health care. To wit, Montana courts
have declined to recognize other implied fundamental rights, in par200
ticular, to government benefits.
By contrast to the equivocal stance on health, Montana courts are
much more inclined to enforce environmental rights under the state
constitution. The same inalienable rights provision that includes
health also lists “a clean and healthy environment.” The environmental right is the first in the list and is not limited to an individual’s
own “seeking,” “possessing,” “pursuing,” “acquiring,” or “defending,”
201
as the other inalienable rights are.
Montana courts have allowed
individual claims to enforce the environmental provision and squarely hold that the right is fundamental.
In Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality, environmental groups sought to enjoin a stateissued exploration license that would have allowed discharge of
groundwater containing high levels of arsenic and zinc into two river
202
aquifers.
The constitutional challenge to the statute authorizing
the license was based on Article II, section 3, which provides that
“[a]ll persons are born free and have certain inalienable
rights. . . . [including] the right to a clean and healthful environ203
ment,” and Article IX, section 1, which expressly requires the state
to “maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment,” protect “environmental life . . . from degradation,” and “prevent unrea204
sonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”
Together, those two constitutional provisions create a judicially enforceable
right.
198
199

200

201
202
203
204

Id. at 1174.
See id. at 1175 (“We hold that, because the State did not demonstrate a compelling interest for applying the conflict-of-interest rule at issue here, the State wrongfully terminated
[the workers’] employment.”).
See Zempel v. Uninsured Employers’ Fund, 938 P.2d 658, 664 (Mont. 1997) (finding no
constitutional violation in excluding businesses operating exclusively on Indian reservations from workers compensation benefits); Butte Cmty Union v. Lewis, 712 P.2d 1309,
1311 (Mont. 1986) (finding no implied fundamental right to state general assistance).
MONT. CONST. art II, § 3.
Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236, 1237 (Mont. 1999) (describing plaintiffs’ request for suspending the exploration license).
Id. at 1243 (citing MONT. CONST. art.II, § 3).
Id. (citing MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1, paras. 1, 3)) (emphasis omitted).
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The court first held that the environmental organizations had
205
standing to bring the challenge. Moreover, the constitutional right
was self-executing, without any legislative enactment, in noted contrast to the Michigan Universal Health Care Action Network decision in
Michigan, which struck the plaintiffs’ claim for lack of standing and
206
lack of an enforceable right.
Under the two constitutional provi207
sions, the MEIC court, citing Wadsworth, recognized a fundamental
right to a clean and healthful environment, any interference with
208
The decision further rewhich would be subject to strict scrutiny.
lied on a detailed historical record of Montana’s 1972 Constitutional
Convention on state environmental protection, suggesting the draf209
ters’ intent that “healthful” modify the term “environment.” Other
Montana decisions have similarly recognized a fundamental right to a
210
“healthful environment” under the state constitution.
While the
State of Montana may have a duty to guarantee a clean and healthful
environment, it has no duty to guarantee individual health or access
to health care or health insurance.

205

206

207
208

209

210

See id. (“[W]e conclude that the allegations in the Plaintiffs’ complaint which are uncontroverted, established their standing to challenge conduct which has an arguably adverse
impact . . . .”).
See Michigan Universal Health Care Action Network v. State, No. 261400, 2005 WL
3116595, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming the lower court’s dismissal of the case on
lack of standing grounds); see also supra notes 101–106 (discussing this case further).
See Wadsworth v. State, 911 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Mont. 1996) (affirming a finding of wrongful termination).
See Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr, 988 P.2d at 1246.
[T]he right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right… and…
any statute or rule which implicates that right must be strictly scrutinized and can
only survive scrutiny if the State establishes a compelling state interest and that its
action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the least onerous path
that can be taken to achieve the State’s objection.
(emphasis omitted) (citing Wadsworth, 911 P.2d at 1174).
Id. at 1247–49; see also Cameron Carter & Kyle Karinen, Note, A Question of Intent: The
Montana Constitution, Environmental Rights, and the MEIC Decision, 22 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 97, 98 (2001) (“MEIC is the first decision by the Montana Supreme
Court to delineate the nature and scope of the environmental provisions contained in
Montana’s Constitution.”); John L. Horwich, Montana’s Constitutional Environmental Quality Provisions: Self-Execution or Self-Delusion?, 57 MONT. L. REV. 323, 323 & n.1 (1996) (providing historical background on Montana’s 1972 Constitution).
See, e.g., Cape-France Enters. v. Estate of Peed, 29 P.3d 1011, 1016–17 (Mont. 2001) (noting that a clean environment is a “fundamental right that may be infringed only by demonstrating a compelling state interest” and allowing plaintiff to drill a well “may cause
significant degradation of uncontaminated aquifers and pose serious public health
risks”).
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7. New Jersey
The lessons of Montana’s implied fundamental rights decisions
apply more broadly to New Jersey. The New Jersey constitution contains no specific provision on health, but New Jersey courts have consistently indentified “preservation of health” as an implied constitu211
tional right.
Beginning with Tomlinson v. Armour & Co., an early products lia212
bility suit over canned ham, the New Jersey Court of Appeals maintained that “[a]mong the most fundamental of personal rights, without which man could not live in a state of society, is the right of
personal security, including the preservation of a man’s health from
213
such practices as may prejudice or annoy it.” Accordingly, the court
upheld the plaintiff’s action against the tainted meat vendor, despite
the presence of a contractual agreement and absence of scienter. As
described in Tomlinson, the right pertains to freedom from interference with health, rather than a right to state-provided health care,
much like the Montana cases. The Tomlinson language has been carried forward and applied more broadly in recent New Jersey decisions, most notably, abortion cases.
In Right to Choose v. Byrne, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck
214
down a state statute on Medicaid funding for abortions. New Jersey’s Medicaid program covered abortions only when the life of the
mother was in danger. The court recognized that a woman’s right to
choose an abortion is a fundamental right of all residents, “including
those entitled to Medicaid reimbursement for necessary medical
215
treatment.” The decision rested on two implied rights in the New
Jersey Constitution: privacy and health. The right to privacy,
211

212

213
214
215

See Helen Hershkoff, The New Jersey Constitution: Positive Rights, Common Law Entitlements,
and State Action, 69 ALB. L. REV. 553, 553–55 (2006) (lauding the New Jersey Supreme
Court as “a jurisprudential entrepreneur . . . on decisions that involve social and economic life” and noting that “[n]ot all important social welfare rights are enumerated in the
New Jersey text”); Judith S. Kaye, Foreward: The Common Law and State Constitutional Law as
Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 727, 738–50 (1992) (describing examples, including New Jersey, of judicial recognition of new individual rights,
outside express constitutional provisions and characterizing trend as “a common law infused with constitutional values”).
See 70 A.314, 316–17 (N. J. 1908), overruled in part by Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) (creating a precedent that privity of contract was no longer
required for implied warranty claim).
Id. at 317 (quotations omitted).
See 450 A.2d 925, 914 (N.J. 1982).
Id. at 934. See also Doe v. Bridgeton Hosp. Ass’n, Inc., 336 A.2d 641, 647 (N.J. 1980)
(holding that hospital’s moral objection to abortion could not override woman’s right to
reproductive choice).
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deemed fundamental, derived from the New Jersey constitution’s express recognition of “certain natural and unalienable rights,” includ216
ing “life, liberty and the pursuit of safety and happiness.” The trial
court also recognized an implied, fundamental right to health, but
the Supreme Court did not go quite that far. The Supreme Court
cited Tomlinson as recognition “that New Jersey accords a high priori217
ty to the preservation of health.”
Then, applying strict scrutiny to
the abortion-funding law, the Byrne court held that “[i]n balancing
the protection of a woman’s health and her fundamental right to privacy against the asserted state interest in protecting potential life, we
218
conclude that the governmental interference is unreasonable.”
219
In another case, Horizon Health Center v. Felicissimo, a family
planning clinic sought to enjoin anti-abortion protesters from picket220
ing on the public sidewalk in front of the clinic. The court upheld
the injunction even though it restricted the protestors’ free speech
221
rights.
Citing both Tomlinson and Byrne, the Court noted that
“[t]he New Jersey Constitution does not guarantee explicitly a fundamental right to health” but does accord a “high priority to the pre222
servation of health.” After recognizing that the state “has a significant interest in insuring unrestricted access to . . . medical services,”
the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in issuing the
223
injunction against interference with that interest.
Felicissimo thus
affirms New Jersey’s recognition of a significant interest, if not fundamental right, to health care. Byrne comes closer to saying that the
state must affirmatively provide certain medically necessary treatment
224
once it establishes a medical assistance program.
Felicissimo does
not compel government action but recognizes the state’s legitimate
interest in ensuring access to medical services, including abortion.
The abortion decisions recognizing health care as a “high priority” were cited in a different context, prisoner health care, and for a
different result, to conclude that the state is not obligated to pay for

216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224

Byrne, 450 A.2d at 933 (citing N.J. CONST. of 1947, art 1, ¶ 1).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 937; see Hershkoff, supra note 211, at 555 (discussing Byrne, 450 A.2d at 941 (N.J.
1982)).
638 A.2d 1260, 1265 (N.J. 1994).
Id. at 1263–64.
Id. at 1270 (“The trial court therefore had the power to issue injunctive restrictions to
preserve health even if those restrictions affected defendants’ First Amendment rights.”).
Id. at 1269.
Id.
See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 936–37 (N.J. 1982) (declining to rest decision
solely on equal protection or due process grounds).
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medical services. In Mourning v. Correctional Medical Services of St.
Louis, inmates challenged a New Jersey law requiring prison inmate
225
A prisoner challenged the cocopayments for medical treatment.
payment statute as violating “his right under the New Jersey State
226
Constitution to reasonable healthcare”
The court acknowledged
that “prison officials have an absolute duty to provide medical care
during a term of imprisonment” but that “‘it is up to the Legislature
227
to determine who should bear the cost.’”
Citing Byrne for the
proposition that the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to recognize
health as a “fundamental right,” the court proceeded to consider the
228
copayment requirement under rational relation scrutiny.
The
court concluded that the state had a “legitimate interest in defraying
the cost of health care provided to inmates . . . and in reducing the
229
alleged abuse of the sick-call policy.”
Accordingly, the copayment
230
law was upheld.
Mourning purported to rely on Byrne, but the holdings are difficult
to reconcile. Mourning suggested that the state must provide health
231
care to prisoners but is not required to pay for all of the services.
Byrne suggested that, in order to protect a woman’s right to medical
care, the state must pay. Tomlinson and Felicissimo recognize the importance of health and take steps to protect that interest from interference by others. Even Byrne, recognizing that the state must fund
all medically necessary abortions for Medicaid beneficiaries, does not
establish an affirmative right for all persons to state-funded medical
care. The decision is consistent with federal equal protection cases,
recognizing that once the government elects to provide certain benefits, it must do so even-handedly.
III. TRENDS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL HEALTH LAW
The preceding survey of constitutions and judicial decisions reveals common limits, exceptions, and distinctions in state constitutional recognition of health. States seem generally reluctant to iden-

225
226
227
228
229
230
231

692 A.2d 529, 530–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997).
Id. at 535.
Id. at 536–37 (quoting Cooper Med. Ctr. v. Johnson, 497 A.2d 909 (Law Div. 1985), aff’d,
504 A.2d 1199 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)).
Id. at 538 (noting that the “plaintiff forthrightly admits” there is no fundamental right to
health under the New Jersey Constitution).
Id.
Id. at 539–40.
Id. at 538 (“Although the government must provide medical care, the Supreme Court has
never held that the government must pay for it.”).
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tify express, enforceable rights to health care for all, although they
extend protection to certain groups and certain types of services for
various reasons explored below. The trends derive from constitutional theory, tradition and history, moral reasoning, pragmatic concerns, and social values. Identifying the limits and underlying reasoning in states’ charter documents adds a new perspective on federal
and state health care reform debates. This discussion suggests answers to fundamental questions about the respective roles of government and individuals in our current health care system and approaches that proposed reforms should consider in balancing those
interests.
State constitutions, for all of their arguable shortcomings,
represent the views of a wide range of stakeholders on some of their
232
most fundamental concerns.
It is significant that several states
enshrine health explicitly in their constitutions, unlike the U.S. Constitution. Understanding the ways in which states extend greater constitutional protection to health and the reasons underlying those decisions should inform both state and federal policymakers’
approaches to health care rights, duties, and responsibilities. Although attention is currently focused on federal reform, states remain central to the health care system through cooperative statefederal health care programs, like Medicaid, and regulation of health
care providers and insurers operating within their borders. States are
poised to play an even greater role in the health care delivery under
new federal laws, with the establishment of state-based health insur-

232

See Gardner, supra note 66, at 831 (noting that state constitutions represent distinct
community values, defined by state boundaries, and demonstrate “clumpy, irregular variations of a single national character” and that “the views of any subgroup of the community, such as the people of a state, might yield a profile somewhat different from the national one”); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1147, 1168 (1993) (“[American constitutionalism] is enriched whenever new
voices are added to the debate over the meaning of the rule of law within a democratic
polity. It is especially enriched because fifty different courts will talk with each other, as
well as with the federal courts, about the meaning of a common enterprise.”); Rodriguez,
supra note 44, at 271 (highlighting that state constitutions are “intrinsically important as
legal frameworks for the implementation of public policy throughout all fifty of the
states”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 393 (arguing that state constitutions represent “the
collection of those particular values that various electoral supermajorities have seen fit to
enshrine in the constitution”) (citation omitted); see also Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—
Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 195 (1984) (“The presence or absence of a clause in a constitution—an equal rights amendment, for instance, or a right of
privacy—may or may not be evidence of societal values, but it is unmistakable evidence of
societal action, of the choice whether to enact an idea into law.”).
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234

ance marketplaces,
Medicaid expansion,
and state-operated
235
health insurance consumer protections and administrative simplifi236
cation. State political processes, including proposals to amend state
constitutions to add health rights, foster the democratic process and
development of novel approaches to health reform.
A. Vulnerable Groups
Of the states that identify a duty to provide or protect health,
some limit the duty to certain vulnerable groups of individuals, including the mentally insane, indigent, and prisoners. States’ willingness to recognize affirmative duties to provide care and treatment for
those groups may be explained by the tradition of states as parens patriae. The duty may also derive from the U.S. Constitution and common law of torts. Some state law protections for vulnerable groups
parallel federal law. In other instances, states’ constitutional protections exceed the federal floor.
1. Mentally Ill
Mississippi, New York, and Arkansas, by constitutional text, and
South Carolina, by judicial interpretation, recognize a duty to provide
237
care and treatment for the mentally ill or insane.
Several other
state decisions involve state-funded psychiatric hospitals. The special
concern for the mentally ill may derive from the tradition of states
acting as parens patriae, or “government as parent.” Parens patriae is
often invoked to justify government protection for the mentally insane, children, and others who are legally incompetent to manage
238
their own affairs.
Mentally ill persons, in particular, have been
233

234
235

236
237

238

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1321, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (regarding state-based American Health Benefit Exchanges and Small Business
Health Options Program (SHOP) Exchanges).
Id. § 2001 (creating new mandatory Medicaid eligibility category for non-elderly, nonpregnant individuals at or below 133% federal poverty level).
Id. § 1002 (providing grants to state to establish office of health insurance consumer information or health insurance ombudsman programs) (amending Public Health Service
Act, § 2793).
Id. § 1413 (streamlining of procedures for enrollment through Exchanges, Medicaid,
CHIP, and health subsidy programs).
See infra Appendices A (listing current constitutional text) and B (summarizing similarities); see also N.Y. CONST., art. XVII, § 4 (regarding “[c]are and treatment of persons suffering from mental disorder or defect”).
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of
emotional disorders to care for themselves . . . .”); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Chr-
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239

deemed proper objects of state parens patriae.
Likewise, the blind,
240
Children
disabled, and children may warrant special protection.
would seem particularly appropriate objects, but none of the state
constitutions specify health care rights or special concern for child241
ren. One conclusion from the trend among states is that states’ paternalistic concern for the health of citizens does not extend to
people needing general medical care, as distinct from those needing
242
mental health care.
The historically greater concern for the mentally ill in some state
constitutions and case law stands in marked contrast to the practice
of commercial health insurers, which tend to cover treatment for
physical health problems more generously than mental health problems. Recent federal mental health parity legislation aimed to cor-

239

240

241

242

ist of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (noting that the parens patriae authority of the crown “devolved upon” the state legislatures); Fontain v. Ravenel, 58
U.S. 369, 384 (1854) (“The State, as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.”); Fontain, 58 U.S. at
393 (Taney, C.J., concurring) (“These prerogative powers, which belong to the sovereign
as parens patriae, remain with the States.”); W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079,
1089 (2d Cir. 1971) (“Parens patriae, literally ‘parent of the country,’ refers traditionally to
the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act
for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown.”); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 47 (1765–1769) (describing the state’s role as
“the general guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics”); GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 95–97
(describing state parens patriae powers).
See Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–27 (recognizing state’s legitimate interest under parens patriae power in confining mentally ill persons who have dangerous tendencies); Antony B.
Klapper, Finding a Right in State Constitutions for Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 142
U. PA. L. REV. 739, 819 (1993) (listing six states with constitutional provisions recognizing
affirmative rights of the mentally ill). But see Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1249, 1292–93 (1987) (concluding that no state, save two “ambiguous” decisions, has recognized an affirmative right to treatment for mentally disabled persons).
See, e.g., ARK. CONST., art. XIX, § 19 (describing duties to the “deaf and dumb and blind
persons,” and also for treatment of the “insane”); MISS. CONST., art. IV, § 86 (providing
for “treatment and care of the insane”); N.C. CONST., art. XI, § 4 (recognizing the duty of
“[b]eneficent provision for the poor, the unfortunate and the orphan”).
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (describing origins of juvenile justice system, in
which the idea was rehabilitation, not punishment, and the “proceedings were not adversary, but that the state was proceeding as parens patriae”); Gilbert T. Venable, Note, The
Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U.
PITT. L. REV. 894, 895 (1966) (describing origin of parens patriae as English King’s power
to protect children and “idiots”).
See, e.g., State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988) (noting that because parens
patriae is premised on state caring for those who cannot care for themselves, power is implicated only when individual cannot make own evaluation of need for treatment); cf.
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (holding that states’ civil commitment
power does not extend to a “nondangerous [mentally ill] individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself”).
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243

rect that disparity. The federal law certainly does not establish any
constitutional duty or even a statutory obligation on commercial
health plans, much less federal or state governments, to provide care
to the mentally ill. But commercial insurance plans that cover mental
health must provide coverage and terms comparable to general
244
health care policies. The law effectively serves as a federal statutory
equal protection law for commercial insurance companies. But it
creates no affirmative right to state-funded mental health care, treatment, or coverage.
State constitutions, by contrast, traditionally have been more generous to mental health needs than physical health needs of individuals. Parens patriae may be one justification inasmuch as the mentally
ill were deemed incompetent to care for themselves. But state police
powers also justify civil confinement of “dangerous” mentally ill indi245
viduals.
It may be that state constitutions recognizing mandatory
duties to care for the mentally ill were not motivated by progressive
notions of parity or special compassion but rather the desire to incapacitate or control “the insane.” Nevertheless, states that constitutionalize a duty to provide treatment, and not merely control and confinement, for the mentally ill, exceed the federal constitutional floor.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not recognized a broad right to treatment for mentally ill individuals as a constitutional requirement of

243

244

245

See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2008) (affording an example of mental health provisions); Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204, 702(a), 110 Stat. 2944 (Sept. 26, 1996),
codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1185a (2008) (including mental health provisions); Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (Oct. 3, 2008)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (including mental
health provisions); Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008, S. 558, 110th
Cong. § 712a(a) (2007) (including a mental health parity provision).
See Carol M. Suzuki, When Something Is Not Quite Right: Considerations for Advising a Client to
Seek Mental Health Treatment, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 209, 242 (2009) (describing
federal parity legislation); Stacey A. Tovino, Neuroscience and Health Law: An Integrative
Approach?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 469, 489–96 (2009) (describing federal and state mental
health parity laws).
See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 (1997) (“The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective and has been historically so regarded.”); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (“[T]he state also has authority under its police power to protect the
community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill.”); State v. Post,
541 N.W.2d 115, 133 (Wis. 1995) (“[T]he state has a compelling interest in protecting the
public from dangerous mentally disordered persons . . . .”); Elizabeth A. Weeks, Note, The
Newly Found “Compassion” for Sexually Violent Predators: Civil Commitment and the Right to
Treatment in the Wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. REV. 1261, 1283–85 (1998) (discussing police power justification for civil commitment).
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246

civil commitment.
State constitutions that specify even a limited
duty to the mentally ill, therefore, are more protective of health care
rights than federal law.
2. Indigent
Indigency is another limit that appears in some state constitutions.
Mississippi, for example, explicitly limits the constitutional recogni247
Other states, such as New York and
tion of health to the poor.
North Carolina, do not recognize health as a distinct constitutional
right but address health care as a component of constitutional provi248
sions on welfare or aid to the needy.
States that limit the duty to
provide health care to financially needy individuals may be operating
under parens patriae justification inasmuch as impoverished persons
249
are considered vulnerable. But there are myriad other justifications
246

247

248

249

See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365–66 (holding that civil confinement, without treatment, “may
be a legitimate end of the civil law”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 322 (1982) (recognizing involuntarily committed mentally disabled individual’s right to such “minimally
adequate” or reasonable training to ensure “safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints”); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975) (declining to decide
“whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State”); see also Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. La. State Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 388 (1902) (cited by majority
in Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366, for proposition that states can civilly detain such persons
even in the absence of treatment); Burgett, supra note 32, at 213 n.32 (clarifying that
“right to treatment” does not suggest affirmative right to state services, but rather a condition on a state’s rights to confine its citizens). See generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, LAW AND
MENTAL DISABILITY 166–213 (1994) (discussing right to treatment). But see Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499, 499 (1960) (advocating right to treatment
for individuals confined in public institutions); Weeks, supra note 245, at 1276–83 (discussing Supreme Court precedent that could support a right to treatment).
MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86 (granting legislature discretion to provide “care of the indigent
sick”); see also HAW. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (regarding “financial assistance, medical assistance
and social services for persons who are found to be in need of . . . such assistance and services”).
See infra Appendices A (listing state constitutional provisions on health) and B (noting
provisions referencing the indigent); see also Hershkoff, supra note 19, at 1135 (estimating
that “more than a dozen state constitutions provide explicit protections for the poor”);
Rory Weiner, Universal Health Insurance under State Equal Protection Law, 23 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 327, 336 (2002) (“[T]wenty-three states . . . have some form of constitutional provision for assisting the poor,” suggesting that “this strategy offers more potential than relying on explicit health-related state constitutional provisions.”); cf. Stacy, supra note 3, at
85 (suggesting judicial approaches to a federal welfare right to health care).
Edelman, supra note 97, at 1703–04 (1993) (“[T]he blind, the deaf, and the incurably
insane were treated fairly consistently as deserving—objects of state assistance not subject
to discretionary judgments about their individual morality or worth.”); see, e.g., Higdon v.
Boning, 296 A.2d 569, 572 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1972) (enforcing municipality’s duty
under state statute to aid the needy to prevent “unnecessary” suffering from “sickness,”
including payment for cerebral palsy patient’s physical therapy and other services).
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underlying government welfare programs, including moral, eco251
252
253
254
nomic, political, historical, and social.
The history of federal welfare policy does not suggest a general
concern for the poor; thus, state constitutions may accord greater
protections. Rather than provide broad, government assistance, federal programs elaborately distinguish between the “deserving” and
255
“undeserving” poor.
Typically, people who became impoverished
through conditions beyond their control are considered more deserving than those perceived to be poor simply because they failed to
256
work hard enough to support themselves.
That view is widely reflected in federal health care programs for the elderly, disabled, and
257
other “blameless” poor.

250

251

252

253

254
255

256

257

See generally J. Donald Moon, The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State, in DEMOCRACY
AND THE WELFARE STATE 27–52 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1988) (discussing various moral justifications for welfare programs).
See, e.g., VICTOR R. FUCHS, WHO SHALL LIVE? HEALTH, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL CHOICE
17–30 (expanded ed., 1999) (discussing economic considerations underlying health care
resource allocation); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 508 (1998)
(“Poverty imposes costs on the nonpoor that warrant, on narrowly economic (i.e., wealthmaximizing) grounds and so without regard to ethical or political considerations, incurring some costs to reduce it.”).
See, e.g., STARR, supra note 96, at 235–89 (describing political contours of social insurance
reform movement in U.S. history); Super, supra note 73, at 593–98 (listing and describing
“Political Sources of Antipoverty Law”).
See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970) (“From its founding the Nation’s
basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its
borders. . . . This perception, against the background of our traditions, has significantly
influenced the development of the contemporary public assistance system.”).
See Handler, supra note 96, at 936–38 (“Much of welfare policy is driven by the belief that
the poor pose silent, insidious threats to dominant ideologies and social order.”).
See Edelman, supra note 97, at 1703 (“America has always had a regard for the ‘deserving’
among its poor, and the categories of deserving poor have broadened as time has passed,
a salutary development that must be noted positively.”); Handler, supra note 96, at 906
(“Thus, the heart of poverty policy centers on the question of who is excused from work.
Those who are excused are the ‘deserving poor’; those who must work are the ‘undeserving.’”); see also RAND E. ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
412 (1997) (suggesting that English and American Poor Laws “distinguished the ‘worthy’
from the ‘unworthy’ poor, i.e., those who had a socially legitimate reason for poverty and
not working (such as advanced age, illness and physical disability) versus those who did
not” and suggesting that the Social Security Act of 1935 reflected that tradition); Moon,
supra note 250, at 48 (suggesting that welfare programs “rely largely upon selective programs in which eligibility is determined by means-testing, rather than the principles of
universality and social insurance”).
See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 265 (“We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the poor contribute to their poverty.”); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND:
AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950–1980 197–99 (1984) (distinguishing between a laid-off
factory worker and a healthy “drone,” who merely refuses to work).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (describing eligibility for Medicare, including persons over age
65, disabled, and with end-stage renal disease); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(a) (listing cate-
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By contrast, state constitutions that recognize duties to provide
health care to the poor, generally, without the finer distinctions typical under federal programs, take a broader view of health rights. On
the other hand, state constitutions’ indigency distinctions may simply
reflect the reality of scarce resources, necessity of line-drawing, and
258
concerns about the appearance of “socialized medicine.” Nevertheless, at least some states expressly acknowledge that people unable to
pay for health care warrant some level of government assistance.
That view only recently began to resonate at the federal level with
proposals and legislation to provide government subsidies and plans
259
to those who cannot afford commercial health insurance coverage.
3. Prisoners
A few state constitutional decisions suggest that criminals and
others in state custody may be entitled to health care. Those cases,
for the most part, closely track federal constitutional law. The U.S.
Supreme Court has held that denying medical care to prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend260
ment. States typically interpret their duty to provide prisoner med-

258

259

260

gories of recipients eligible for Medicaid); ROSENBLATT, supra note 255, at 425 (citing
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 262–64 (1974)) (discussing market-based
justifications for Medicaid categories); WELFARE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF U.S.
POLICY AND POLITICS 1 (Gwendolyn Mink & Rickie Solinger eds., 2003) (“Nevertheless,
many of the negative assumptions about the poor that powered the politics and policy of
relief also powered the politics and policy of welfare, both at its origins and in the present
day”); Edelman, supra note 97, at 1703–09 (summarizing U.S. welfare programs for the
“deserving” poor); Handler, supra note 96, at 909–10 (describing welfare programs “for
particular categories of the poor,” including Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)).
See Graham v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 485, 491 (N.C. 1968) (rejecting nonindigent patient’s equal protection argument, noting that “[s]uch a contention is least expected from those who, under other circumstances, decry the expansion of the welfare
state and urge medical and hospital insurance with private corporations as a bulwark
against socialized medicine”).
See Blumberg & Holahan, supra note 76, at 7 (discussing individual mandate and subsidies); Jacob S. Hacker, Healthy Competition—The Why and How of “Public-Plan Choice,” 360
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2269, 2269 (2009); Robert Pear, Reach of Subsidies is Critical Issue for
Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2009, at A1; see also Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 2001, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (Medicaid expansion); id.
§ 1402 (premium credits and cost-sharing subsidies to eligible individuals between 100
and 400% of federal poverty level).
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” [violates] the Eighth Amendment); see Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 948, 969 n.2914
(2007) (listing Supreme Court cases applying “deliberate indifference” standard); see also
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (contracting out prison medical care does not relieve
state of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those in its cus-
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ical care in lockstep with federal law, providing no more than the mi261
nimal requirement. For example, New Jersey recognized prisoners’
right to medical care but upheld a state law requiring them to pay a
262
portion of their care. North Carolina declined to impose a duty on
local governments to pay for private hospital care for an individual
263
who was in police non-arrest custody.
264
Others in state custody, such as juveniles and mentally disabled
265
266
persons, may be entitled to health care on similar grounds. If DeShaney’s “Poor Joshua” had been in state protective custody, rather

261

262
263
264

265

266

tody); City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983) (“The Due Process
Clause . . . require[s] the responsible government or governmental agency to provide
medical care to persons . . . who have been injured while being apprehended by the police.”); Blumstein, supra note 30, at 1381 (“The irony of Gamble rests on the fact that an
indigent in need of medical treatment becomes constitutionally entitled to it only if he is
incarcerated.”).
See Brennan, The Bill of Rights, supra note 65, at 550–51 (“Some state courts and commentators have taken umbrage at the suggestion that proceeding in lockstep with the Supreme Court is the only way to avoid irrational law enforcement.”); Gardner, supra note
66, at 791 (“[L]ockstep analysis of the state constitution discourages the development of
an independent state constitutional discourse.”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 421 (“Interpreting the state constitution to mean the same as the federal represents a kind of middle
position between the duty to apply federal law and the ability to engage in independent
interpretation of the state constitution.”).
See supra notes 225–231 and accompanying text (discussing Mourning v. Correctional Med.
Servs. of St. Louis, 692 A.2d 529 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
See supra notes 151–158and accompanying text (discussing Craven County Hosp. Corp. v.
Lenoir County, 331 S.E.2d 690 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)).
Compare Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983) (juveniles have no right to
rehabilitative treatment under the Constitution) with Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360
(7th Cir. 1974) (juveniles have a right to rehabilitative treatment under the Fourteenth
Amendment), and Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 375–76 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (acknowledging conflicting case law on juveniles’ constitutional right to treatment), and Alexander
S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995) (juveniles have a right to rehabilitative treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment), and Lavette v. City of New
York, 316 N.E.2d 314, 317 (1974) (describing the right to treatment for children under
state custodial supervision, premised on due process liberty deprivation).
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U. S. 307, 317 (1982) (“When a person is institutionalized—
and wholly dependent on the State[,] . . . a duty to provide certain services and care does
exist . . . .”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1981) (declining to decide whether mentally retarded individuals residing at a state institution are
entitled to treatment); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that mentally handicapped patients civilly committed at state institutions have a constitutional right to treatment).
See Wing, supra note 3, at 163 (“The Supreme Court has recognized that government has
some affirmative responsibility to provide for the needs, including the medical needs, of
mental patients, the institutionalized retarded, prisoners, and, presumably, other wards of
the state or federal governments.”).
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than his father’s care, it seems likely that the case would have been
267
decided differently, at least as a matter of federal constitutional law.
The rationale for this principle is simple enough: when the State by the
affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it
renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs—e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, and reasonable safety—it transgresses the substantive limits on state
268
action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.

Under similar reasoning, federal decisions recognize states’ constitu269
tional duty to protect children placed in state foster care.
States are bound only to the federal constitutional minimum and
270
could extend greater protection to prisoners and others in custody.
So far, none have accepted the invitation with respect to health care
271
rights. By comparison, all but two states adopted explicit constitutional provisions limiting the severity of punishment for convicted
criminals, and thirty-five of those provisions differ substantially from

267

268

269

270

271

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200–01 (1989) (“The
[right to treatment] analysis simply has no applicability in the present case. Petitioners
concede that the harms Joshua suffered occurred not while he was in the State’s custody,
but while he was in the custody of his natural father . . . .”). But see id. at 206–09 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (faulting the Court for failing to consider other, non-physical ways in
which the state took control over Joshua).
Id. at 200; see also Currie, supra note 33, at 874 (suggesting that prisoner medical treatment cases do not an establish an affirmative right but merely demonstrate a due process
violation because “by locking an individual up without providing such services, the government has deprived him of them in the most traditional sense”).
See, e.g., Berman v. Young, 291 F.3d 976, 982 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Recognizing the ‘special
relationship’ exception to the general DeShaney rule, we have held that once a state removes a child from her parents’ custody, it has sufficiently restrained the liberty of the
child and therefore assumes a duty of safekeeping.”); Burton v. Richmond, 276 F.3d 973,
978–79 (8th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing DeShaney because child was clearly in state custodial foster care); see also DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9 (recognizing that several lower courts
held “that the State may be held liable under the Due Process Clause for failing to protect
children in foster homes from mistreatment at the hands of their foster parents”); Wing,
supra note 3, at 163 (suggesting that when the Supreme Court recognized an affirmative
duty to provide medical care for “mental patients, the institutionalized retarded, prisoners,” and other wards of the state, “the Court has premised its reasoning on the fact that
the protected individual was in the custody, in the most literal sense, of the government”).
See Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 65, at 502 (“[D]ecisions of the [U.S. Supreme]
Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by
counterpoint provisions of state law.”).
Cf. PERLIN, supra note 246, at 195–96 (“[T]here has been virtually no case law on the
question of a state constitutional right to treatment on behalf of mentally disabled persons.”); Klapper, supra note 239, at 739 (suggesting possibilities for recognizing right to
treatment under state constitutions).
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272

the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.
The New Jersey and
North Carolina decisions on health care rights of those in custody
suggest that states acknowledge the constitutional duty but resist
bearing the full financial burden of providing the care.
A duty to provide medical care to persons in state custody would
also be consistent with common-law torts principles. As a general
rule, there is no duty to provide affirmative care, protection, aid, or
273
warning.
But if the defendant takes the plaintiff into custody or
274
otherwise deprives him of access to care, then a duty arises. Some
states have recognized affirmative duties on law enforcement officers
275
under state tort law, if not state constitutional law.
B. Types of Services
In addition to limiting constitutional protection to particular vulnerable groups, states also limit the types of those services they are
obligated to provide. Several constitutions recognize public health,
276
distinguished from individual health care or medical treatment.

272

273

274

275

276

See Richard S. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences Under Federal and State Constitutions,
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 39, 64–69 (2008) (summarizing state constitutional provisions and
defendant-favorable case law).
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 227, 578–79 (2000) (describing general “no duty”
rule); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965); see, e.g., Union Pacific Ry. v. Cappier, 72 P. 281, 283 (Kan. 1903) (denying recovery to trespasser killed by train and distinguishing cases allowing recovery, in which “the person injured was in the custody and
care of those who were at fault in failing to give him proper treatment.”); Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 475 (Minn. 1993) (holding private boat owner not liable for injuries to passenger who dove into shallow water); Yania v. Bigan, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.
1959) (“The mere fact that Bigan saw Yania in a position of peril . . . imposed upon him
no legal, although a moral, obligation or duty to go to his rescue . . . .”).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965); see, e.g., People v. Wong, 588
N.Y.S.2d 119, 124 (1992) (discussing the legal duties created by a contractual babysitting
agreement and the “voluntary assumption of complete and exclusive care of a helpless
child”); Mirand v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 264-266 (N.Y. 1994) (holding the
school board liable for harm sustained when two sisters were assaulted by another student, recognizing “[t]he duty owed derives from the simple fact that a school, in assuming physical custody and control over its students, effectively takes the place of parents
and guardians”).
See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Kotzebue, 627 P.2d 623, 628–29 (Alaska 1981) (discussing the
possibility that custodial officers might owe a heightened duty of care to intoxicated prisoners or arrestees to see that they are protected from harming themselves or from harm
by others); Clemets v. Heston, 485 N.E.2d 287, 291 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) (noting an affirmative duty on a law officer to protect those the officer has arrested and has in custody).
See infra Appendix B (identifying eight states’ provisions).
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277

Other constitutions specify environmental rights.
One state’s con278
Several states recogstitution is expressly limited to hospital care.
nize constitutional rights to a particular medical procedure, abortion,
279
but not health care more generally.
1. Public Health
State police powers have long been recognized to encompass pro280
Until the New Deal, the
tection and promotion of public health.
power to act in the interest of public health was exclusively the prov281
ince of states. Consistent with the historical role of states in public
health, more than half of the constitutions surveyed and several judicial decisions distinguish between the states’ duty with respect to the
282
public’s health, as opposed to individual health.
“Health care” focuses on individual wellness or freedom from pathology, whereas
“public health” is concerned with promoting optimal health of the
283
population as a whole. The goal of public health is not simply im-

277

278
279
280

281

282
283

See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (stating that inalienable rights include “the right to a
clean and healthful environment” and “health”); S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (describing
health and the conservation of natural resources as “matters of public concern”).
See MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86.
See infra Part III.B.4.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905) (“According to settled principles, the
police power of a State must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public
safety.”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824) (stating that it is within
states’ powers to enact “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description”).
James G. Hodge, Jr., Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93,
94 (1997)(“[A]s the states’ exclusive power to regulate in the interests of public health
was limited judicially and politically, public health law began to shift from states to the
federal government, largely during the New Deal.”); see also GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 91
(“The states and localities have had the predominant public responsibility for populationbased health services since the founding of the republic.”); Parmet, supra note 19, at 272
(“Public health actions lay within the core of the police power.”).
See infra Appendix B.
Nancy M. Baum et al., Looking Ahead: Addressing Ethical Challenges in Public Health Practice,
35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 657, 658–59 (2007) (distinguishing “public health from individually oriented health care” and urging that “public health ethics is a field of inquiry in its
own right”); Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: Population-Level Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1607, 1608 (1997) (defining “health” as
a “personal, medical matter, a state of freedom from pathology achieved by an individual
through the mediation of a doctor” and characterizing “[p]ublic health, by contrast . . . as
an attribute of communities in social and physical environments”); Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing a Collective Human Right to
Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 112–15, 121–24 (2005) (distinguishing
“health” and “public health” rights); Andrew W. Siegel, The Jurisprudence of Public Health:
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proving individual health outcomes but the common good.
According to some, public health, welfare, and security were the very
285
reasons for establishing government in the origin of society.
By contrast, there is no long-standing tradition of state involvement in individual medical care. Consistent with the negative rights
orientation and free-market tradition, individuals, through their own
efforts, are left to secure necessary health care for themselves and
286
their families.
Health care is viewed as a matter of individual, not
287
Individuals privately contract with health
collective, responsibility.
care providers and insurers, as they would for any other good or ser288
vice.
That libertarian view is exemplified in Montana’s decisions
recognizing a fundamental right to employment as means to obtain-

284

285

286

287

288

Reflections on Lawrence O. Gostin’s Public Health Law, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
359, 361–62 (2001) (“Public health law is concerned with the state’s role in advancing the
health of the community, whereas health care law is concerned with the ‘microrelationships between health care providers and patients.’” (quoting LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 15 (2000))).
WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE LAW 9 (2009) (“[T]he focus
of public health is on the health or well-being of people, not individuals.”); Baum, supra
note 283, at 657 (noting “public health’s emphasis on population health rather than issues of individual health”); Lawrence O. Gostin, Health of the People: The Highest Law?, 32
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 509, 510 (2004) (“The field of public health would profit from a vibrant conception of ‘the common’ that sees public interests as more than the aggregation
of individual interests.”).
See PARMET, supra note 284, at 15 (quoting the maxim “salus populi suprema lex” (“The well
being of the public is the supreme law”) as meaning that attainment of public safety “was
the rationale for civil society”); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2004) (describing the same maxim as having “powerful
roots . . . in the American political tradition”); James A. Tobey, Public Health and the Police
Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REV. 126, 126 (1927) (suggesting that government is “organized for the
express purpose, among others, of conserving the public health”).
See DAVID DRANOVE, THE ECONOMIC EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 7–9 (2000)
(tracing the demise of “Marcus Welby medicine” and the rise of market-based health
care); ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 255, at 32–33 (explaining market-competition view
of health care); Jonathan Oberlander, The Political Economy of Unfairness in U.S. Health Policy, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 245, 252 (2006) (“American political culture values liberty
over equity, cherishes markets and individual responsibility over government and social
solidarity . . . .”); Arnold S. Relman & Uwe E. Reinhardt, Debating For-Profit Health Care and
the Ethics of Physicians, 5 HEALTH AFF. 16 (1986) (“If one looked for die-hard champions of
free enterprise and libertarian thought, one could always find them among our physicians.”).
See, e.g., Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., The Concept of Health and the Right to Health Care, 3 SOC.
THOUGHT 5, 5 (1977) (noting the common perception that “being healthy is primarily a
matter of individual responsibility”); Yvonne Denier, On Personal Responsibility and the Human Right to Health Care, 14 CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS, 224, 224 (2005) (discussing “the role of personal responsibility in healthcare,” noting, “[o]n the one hand, it
is reasonable to hold people responsible for the consequences of their actions”).
See, e.g., Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901) (rejecting patient’s personal injury claim for physician’s “refusal to enter into a contract of employment”).
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ing individual health care but not a fundamental right to state unemployment or health care benefits. For similar reasons, state courts
upheld challenges to various obstacles to obtaining individual health
289
care.
290
Public health, by contrast, largely rejects market theory. Tradi291
tional public health objectives, including sanitation, infectious disease control, nuisance abatement, public safety, and pure food and
292
drinking water, cannot be secured through individual effort and
call for coordination through centralized government. Collective action and public benefit are hallmarks of public health interven293
tions. Public health, for example, may justify a state paying to treat
infectious disease because otherwise the infected individual would
294
endanger the health and safety of all.
There is some tradition of
289

290

291

292
293

294

See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 989 P.2d 364, 384 (Mont. 1999) (striking down restriction on
choice of provider); Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260 (N.J. 1994)
(upholding injunction on abortion clinic protesters as obstructing access to medical
care).
See PARMET, supra note 284, at 15–16 (explaining but rebutting traditional market-theory
view that government intervention is required only when private markets are flawed or
fail); STARR, supra 96, at 180–89 (describing historical tension between medical profession and public health); Burris, supra note 283, at 1608 (“[T]o accept the rhetorical structure of market individualism is to accept a political language that has no words for public
health.”).
See STARR, supra note 96, at 181 (“In mid-nineteenth-century America, public health was
mainly concerned with sanitary reform and affiliated more closely with engineering than
with medicine.”); Elizabeth Fee, The Origins and Development of Public Health in the United
States, reprinted in LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW & ETHICS: A READER, at 27,
28 (from 1 OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PUBLIC HEALTH (3d ed. 1997)) (“In the colonies, public health consisted of activities deemed necessary to protect the population from the
spread of epidemic diseases, by the enactment of sanitary laws and regulations governing
such matters as the construction of toilets, the disposal of wastes, and the disposition of
dead animals.”); Parmet, supra note 19, at 290 (“[P]ublic sanitation regulations in Massachusetts go back as far as 1634 . . . .”).
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 95 (listing various state public health powers).
Id. at 9 (“[N]o single individual or group of individuals can ensure his or her health.
Meaningful protection and assurance of the population’s health require communal effort.”); INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (1988) (“Public
health is what we, as a society, do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be
healthy.”); STARR, supra note 96, at 180 (“[P]ublic health [is] ‘the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life, and promoting physical health and efficiency through
organized community efforts . . . and the development of the social machinery which will
ensure to every individual in the community a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of health.’”); Michael Walzer, Security and Welfare, reprinted in GOSTIN, supra note
291, at 69, 75 (from Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (1983)) (“Dealing
with tuberculosis, cancer, or heart failure, however, requires a common effort. Medical
research is expensive, and the treatment of many particular diseases lies far beyond the
resources of any ordinary citizens. So the community must step in . . . .”).
See, e.g., Graham v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 485, 491 (N.C. 1968) (upholding
provision of free tuberculosis treatment to the indigent, noting [i]t is within the police
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federal public health regulation, but the federal role is not constitu295
tionally recognized or as broad as states’ authority.
The scope of public health recognized in state constitutions is
consistent with the negative rights orientation. The traditional scope
of public health was limited to collective action problems in which
individual efforts cannot secure the desired outcome. The “new” public health takes a broader view, addressing seemingly individual
health habits or conditions, such as obesity, smoking, domestic vi296
olence, firearms, and socioeconomic disparities. In the traditional
public health view, states avoid interfering with individual rights un297
less necessary to protect the community. If the broader, “new” public health view gains wider acceptance, the implications could be
dramatic. States that constitutionally recognize a duty to protect and
promote the public health may be required to intervene more directly and affirmatively in a wide range of individual preferences, habits,
and activities.

295
296

297

power of the State to provide treatment for infectious and contagious disease, which—if
untreated—can become epidemic”); Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387, 389 (S.C. 1909) (holding that it “is a reasonable exercise of the police power” to establish boards of health and
pesthouses); GOSTIN, supra note 291, at 24 (suggesting that within the context of the industrial revolution and increased urbanization “citizens began to think of the control of
disease as being properly within the sphere of government control”).
See GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 155–61 (describing and cataloging history of federal public
health regulation).
See THEODORE H. TULCHINSKY & ELENA A. VARAVIKOVA, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH: AN
INTRODUCTION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, 106–09 (2000) (describing World Health Organization definition of the “New Public Health (NPH)” as “a philosophy which endeavors to
broaden the older understanding of public health so that, for example, it includes the
health of the individual in addition to the health of populations, and seeks to address
such contemporary health issues as are concerned with equitable access to health services, the environment, political governance and social and economic development.”); Epstein, supra note 285, at 1423 (distinguishing “old” and “new” public health and listing examples of inspection, quarantine, and vaccination for the former, and tort reform, access
to health care, and relieving wealth disparity for the latter); Lawrence O. Gostin & M.
Gregg Bloche, The Politics of Public Health: A Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY &
MED. S160, S162 (2003) (responding to Epstein’s and other “conservatives’” attacks on
public health but agreeing that “there is a ‘new’ public health, broader in its reach
than . . . control of infectious disease”); Meier & Mori, supra note 283, at 119 (“[M]odern
public health programs can be framed expansively as part of a social justice movement . . . .”).
See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905) (“But the liberty secured by the
Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import
an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed
from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good.”); see, e.g., GOSTIN supra note 27, at xxv (summarizing “the dominant liberal position that individual freedom is by far the preferred value to guide ethical
and legal analysis in matters of physical and mental health”).
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2. Environmental Health
Just as there is no federal constitutional right to health, there is no
298
Montana and
federal constitutional right to a clean environment.
several other states have expressly extended protection of environmental rights above the federal floor. Some state constitutional pro299
visions are framed in terms of environmental health.
The environmental provisions are supported by reasoning similar to the
public health provisions and do not provide support for a broader,
individual right to health care.
Montana’s constitutional environmental rights are particularly robust, with two constitutional provisions and judicial recognition of a
300
self-executing, individually enforceable right.
Other states’ constitutions identify the environment or natural resources, but do not in301
terpret them as broadly as Montana.
Montana’s judicial enforce298

299

300

301

See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 49–50
(5th ed. 2007) (describing courts’ resistance to recognition of federal constitutional environmental rights); J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed
Environmental Quality Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (1999)
(evaluating proposed environmental quality amendments to U.S. Constitution).
See, e.g., HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (“Each person has the right to a clean and healthful
environment. . . .”); ILL. CONST. art XI, § 1 (“The public policy of the State and the duty
of each person is to provide and maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this
and future generations.”); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent
with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”); MONT. CONST. art IX, § 1, ¶ 1 (“The
state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in
Montana for present and future generations.”); PENN. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (The people
have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment.”). See generally Barton H. Thompson Jr., The
Environment and Natural Resources, in 3 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 307 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert
F. Williams eds., 2006) (discussing state constitutional provisions protecting natural resources and the environment, suggesting that “[a] majority of state constitutions seek to
protect the public’s interest in natural resources and the environment”); Mary Ellen Cusack, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment,
20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 182 & nn.60, 62 (1993) (listing seven states’ environmental provisions); Horwich, supra note 209, at 325 n.13 (listing eight states, including Montana); A.E. Dick Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. REV. 193 (1972)
(describing the then-recent trend of states adopting constitutional environmental provisions).
See Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Quality, 988 P. 2d 1236, 1237 (Mont.
1999); Horwich, supra note 209, at 323 & n.1 (quoting public land law scholar Charles
Wilkinson, and describing Montana’s Constitution as “the single strongest statement of
conservation philosophy in the constitution of any state and, very likely, of any nation in
the world”).
See, e.g., Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.2d 1034, 1044 (Ill. 1999) (limiting state constitutional protection to pollution, explicitly excluding biodiversity conservation); Machi-
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ment of environmental rights, like its strong negative rights orientation to health, is consistent with themes of rugged individualism and
302
the frontier American West. Under that view, the government generally should refrain from interfering with individual rights unless
necessary to secure communal wants and needs. Clean air and water,
like public health, are classic nonexcludable, nonexclusive “public
goods,” requiring collective action to secure, protect, and promote.
The community as a whole has a stake in environmental protection, hygiene and sanitation, clean air and surface water, uncontaminated food
and drinking water, safe roads and products, and control of infectious
disease. These collective goods, and many more, are essential conditions
for health. Yet these benefits can be secured only through organized ac303
tion on behalf of the people.

By contrast, health insurance and medical care are typically considered private goods for which individuals are responsible for obtaining on the private market, through their own effort and resources.
State constitutional provisions on environmental health provide little
support for health rights more generally.

302

303

pongo Land & Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 799 A.2d 751, 774–75 (Pa. 2002) (allowing
state to defend takings claim against coal mine by showing that proposed mine had high
potential to pollute stream); Margaret J. Fried & Monique J. Van Damme, Environmental
Protection in a Constitutional Setting, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1369 (1995) (urging stronger recognition of environmental rights under Pennsylvania’s constitution); Cusack, supra note
299, at 182–91 (discussing enforcement challenges); Howard, supra note 299, at 202–04
(listing states’ constitutional provisions declaring environmental “rights” and statutes allowing citizens’ suits).
See Gardner, supra note 66, at 817 (“The founders of a populist frontier state with a tradition of ferocious individualism, like Washington or Oregon, probably intended to carve
out a larger sphere of rights, a larger arena of activity into which the government could
not intrude” (quoting David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report
from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 275, 285 (1989)));
Thompson, supra note 299, at 307 (describing new Western states’ approaches to natural
resources and the environment, including constitutional protections).
GOSTIN, supra note 27, at 9; see Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure
and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 942–56, 981–83 (2005) (defining terms
and applying them to the environment); John S. Harbison, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy:
Property Rights, Public Values, and Instream Waters, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 535, 547–48
(1991) (describing instream water as a public good that is both nonrival and nonexclusive); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (describing collective action problems in providing public
goods); Ronald H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (defining public goods as nonexclusive, nonexcludable goods, such as a lighthouse beacon).
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3. Hospital Care
At least one state, Mississippi, expressly limits the state’s constitu304
tional authority to provide health care to the indigent in hospitals.
Other states’ constitutions, not surveyed above, expressly authorize
305
the state to build public hospitals.
Those provisions reflect states’
traditional, limited role in providing health care to residents through
306
almshouses, public hospitals, pesthouses, or sanatoria.
Similarly,
early private and quasi-governmental health insurance programs typically covered only the catastrophic risk of hospitalization, not a full
307
array of routine and preventative medical care.
Often, access to
308
state hospitals was limited to the poor.
Thus, the hospital-only limit on state constitutional recognition of
309
health may be simply a subset of the indigency limit.
The provisions may also fall under the public health duty. To the extent that
state hospitals were established to treat infectious diseases, they fall
within the scope of public health, rather than individual medical
310
care. If nothing else, the constitutional provisions on hospitals reflect an attempt to define narrowly any state responsibility and allocate scarce resources to the specific service of inpatient, acute care.

304
305

306

307

308

309
310

MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 86.
See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 93.12 (“The state . . . may acquire, build, establish, own,
operate and maintain hospitals, health centers, sanatoria and other health facilities. The
legislature for such purposes may appropriate public funds and may authorize counties,
municipalities and other political subdivisions to appropriate their funds . . . .”).
STARR, supra note 96, at 150 (“By making the almshouse the only source of governmental
aid to the poor, legislatures hoped to restrict expenditures for public assistance.”); Sara
Rosenbaum, supra note 49, at 26 (“Prior to 1965 of course, the bulk of local spending on
indigent health care took the form of direct investments in health care facilities such as
public hospitals and clinics.”).
See ROSENBLATT ET AL., supra note 255, at 10 (describing the history of Blue Cross, covering hospital but not physician services); id. at 369–70 (describing the political background of the original Medicare program, which began as Part A, hospital insurance);
STARR, supra note 96, at 295–96 (describing the emergence of Blue Cross and other early
insurance plans to cover hospital care).
See, e.g., Graham v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 161 S.E.2d 485, 491 (N.C. 1968) (upholding
North Carolina’s provision of free tuberculosis treatment to the indigent only, noting
“[i]t is within the police power of the State to provide treatment for infectious and contagious diseases, which—if untreated—can become epidemic”); Kirk v. Wyman, 65 S.E. 387,
391 (S.C. 1909) (noting deplorable conditions of city pesthouses and acknowledging that
“even temporary isolation in such a place would be a serious affliction and peril to an elderly lady, enfeebled by disease, and accustomed to the comforts of life”).
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.B.1.
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4. Abortion
Several decisions construing state constitutions’ protection for
health arose in the context of abortion. New York found that refusing to fund abortions under a state parental assistance program did
not violate the Public Health provision because the program was not
311
aimed at protecting public health.
Montana struck down restrictions on abortion providers because the law violated, among other
312
rights, the inalienable right to health. New Jersey required the state
313
Medicaid program to cover all medically necessary abortions and
upheld an injunction against abortion protesters found by the trial
314
court to have obstructed access to medical services.
To the extent that any of those cases establish a right to the particular medical treatment of abortion, they provide little support for a
right to health care generally. The New York decision suggests little
other than the court’s reluctance to allow individual claims under the
Public Health Provision and the traditional scope of public health as
pertaining to community, not individual, health. The Montana provider choice and New Jersey abortion protester cases are consistent
with a negative rights view, preventing interference with, but not requiring affirmative provision of, medical treatment.
The New Jersey Medicaid decision, Right to Choose v. Byrne, came
the closest to establishing an affirmative right to publicly funded
abortions. The court declined to recognize a fundamental right to
315
health but noted that the state places a “high priority” on health.
The decision rested primarily on the implied fundamental right to
privacy and sounded in equal protection. The Byrne court made clear
that the state is not constitutionally required to fund all abortions for
all people in the state but “may not jeopardize the health and privacy
of poor women by excluding medically necessary abortions from a
system providing all other medically necessary care for the indi316
gent.”

311
312

313
314
315
316

Hope v. Perales, 634 N.E.2d 183, 188 (N.Y. 1994).
Armstrong v. State, 989 P. 2d 364, 383–84 (Mont. 1999) (resting its holding primarily on
the right to privacy, the court noted the “overlapping . . . guarantee[]” of “the inalienable
right to . . . health. . . i.e., in the context of this case, the right to seek and obtain medical
care from a chosen health care provider and to make personal judgments affecting one’s
own health and bodily integrity without government interference”).
Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982).
Horizon Health Ctr. v. Felicissimo, 638 A.2d 1260, 1264, 1274 (N.J. 1994).
Byrne, 450 A.2d at 934.
Id.
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By contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court had held two years earlier
that states are not constitutionally obligated to fund abortions at all
317
Federal abortion funding cases, even while reunder Medicaid.
cognizing a fundamental privacy right in the decision to have an
318
abortion, do not limit states’ authority “to make a value judgment
favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that judgment
319
by the allocation of public funds.” The Court subsequently backed
down from the fundamental rights approach, replacing “close scrutiny” with the “undue burden” test for government regulation of a
320
woman’s interest in abortion.
But even under the more rigorous standard of review, lack of government funding was not considered to interfere with a woman’s
321
right to an abortion. Denial of state funding or access to public facilities leaves a woman “no worse off” than if the state had done noth322
Moreover, poverty is not a suspect class that warrants
ing at all.
323
heightened scrutiny for equal protection purposes. Thus, states are
not required to pay for abortions, even though some women’s lives
324
The federal abortion funding cases express the
may be at risk.
same negative rights view as DeShaney: The state’s failure to intervene
325
to protect the child from his abusive father left him no worse off.
317
318
319
320
321

322

323

324

325

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325–26 (1980).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–55 (1973).
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876–77 (1992).
Harris, 448 U.S. at 314–15, 322–23; see Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–78; Weiner, supra note 249,
at 353–54 (explaining Court’s decisions that restrictions on state funding for abortions do
not constitute government interference with the right to abortion); Wing, supra note 3, at
168–69 (explaining that exclusions or limitations on government health programs are
not subject to heightened review).
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (upholding state law that
prohibits use of state employees or facilities to perform abortions not necessary to save
the mother’s life); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 198 (1991) (extending rationale
to uphold federal statute prohibiting public funding to health care facilities that counsel
abortions); Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–17 (while a state “may not place obstacles in the path
of a woman’s exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own
creation. Indigency falls into the latter category.”).
Maher, 432 U.S. at 470–71 (stating that “[a]n indigent woman desiring an abortion does
not come within the limited category of disadvantaged classes” and finding no discrimination against a suspect class).
Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–18; Blumstein, supra note 30, at 1378–79 (noting that the Court
distinguished a woman’s interest in protecting her own health from claimed constitutional entitlement to public funds for abortions); Wing, supra note 3, at 169–70 (discussing
Harris).
Blumstein, supra note 30, at 1379 (“Freedom from governmental intrusion in a private
realm does not automatically establish ‘an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary
to realize all the advantages of that freedom.’” (quoting Harris, 448 U.S. at 318)); Wing,
supra note 3, at 168 (drawing a similar comparison to DeShaney).

1388

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:5

Likewise, a state’s failure to intervene to protect a woman whose
health or life is in danger if she cannot obtain an abortion leaves her
no worse off.
Federal law, although recognizing abortion rights, requires no affirmative state action to protect the right. States may, of course, give
326
greater protection to individual rights than federal law. Byrne establishes New Jersey’s decision to elevate women’s abortion rights above
327
the constitutionally mandated federal floor. Montana and New Jersey also seem to recognize a broader notion of “interference” than
federal precedents by striking down restrictions on choice of medical
provider and limiting free speech of abortion protesters.
But the enhanced protection that some states accord to abortion
does not extend to health care, more broadly defined. Abortion is a
singular, ideologically charged issue that encompasses much more
328
than a medical procedure. There is no basis for assuming that state
courts would apply the same principles in the same way to other
health care services or government-funded medical care. The state
abortion cases tell more about the state constituencies’ religious beliefs, moral values, political ideologies, and medical standards than
the value they place on health as a constitutional right.
C. State Constitutional Amendments
In evaluating the role of state constitutional provisions on health
reform debates, it is useful to consider, at least briefly, not only what
state constitutions include but also what amendments states have rejected. Several states recently considered constitutional amendments
expressly recognizing broad, individually enforceable rights to

326

327

328

See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931–32 (N.J. 1982) (noting that “the individual states may accord greater respect than the federal government to certain fundamental
rights”); see also supra notes 64–66 (discussing Justice Brennan’s articles and “new federalism”).
See Weiner, supra note 248, at 354 & n.142 (discussing and citing state abortion cases, including Byrne, that “have gone beyond the Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of
what constitutes government ‘interference’”).
Describing the abortion cases as sui generis, the Casey Court noted:
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who
perform and assist in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must
confront the knowledge that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence against innocent human life; and, depending on
one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992); see also Harris, 448 U.S.
at 325 (“Abortion is inherently different from other medical procedures, because no other procedure involves the purposeful termination of a potential life.”).
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329

health.
In all cases, the proposals failed. In some states, the
amendment debates served as catalysts for comprehensive legislative
enactments. Even states typically considered progressive in many
areas of health care reform have declined to constitutionalize universal health care rights. Like the adopted provisions, the proposed
state constitutional amendments share certain common features.
Notably, the rights-creating language in the proposed amendments is much more explicit than the provisions currently in effect in
some states. All of the proposed amendments affirmatively require
state action and adequate financing for health care. Also, the
amendments typically suggest a universal right, not limited to the
mentally ill, indigent, helpless, in-custody, or other particular groups.
The scope of the right would also be more comprehensive, including
not just hospital or public health but a package of essential, comprehensive medical care. In addition, affordability is a key component of
the proposed amendments, suggesting not just social or welfare rights
but an economic right to health care. Overall, the proposals are
much more detailed and explicit than existing state constitutions that
mention health, coming closer to legislative enactments than general
330
statements of public values or aspirations.
331
332
In both Massachusetts and Minnesota, the proposed constitutional amendments were not adopted, but the state legislatures

329

330

331

332

See generally Kathrin Rüegg, Embedding the Human Right to Health Care in U.S. State Constitutions: A Progress Review and Lessons for Advocates, (Human Right to Health Program, Working Paper, 2009) (tracking history of attempts to amend constitutions in Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Michigan, and Oregon, and mentioning additional proposals in North Carolina and Florida), available at http://www.nesri.org/programs/Constitutional_
Amendment_Report_2-09.pdf.
See Gardner, supra note 66, at 819 (“[S]tate constitutions differ from the federal constitution in the level of detail in which they describe, and therefore the extent to which they
constrain, governmental action with respect to subjects covered by the constitution.”); G.
Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1169, 1181–83 (1992) (explaining the prominence of “statutory” provisions in state constitutions, compared to the
U.S. Constitution).
See Health Care for Massachusetts Campaign, The Health Care Amendment (“Upon ratification of this amendment and thereafter, it shall be the obligation and duty of the Legislature and executive officials, on behalf of the Commonwealth, to enact and implement
such laws, subject to approval of the voters at a statewide election, as will ensure that no
Massachusetts resident lacks comprehensive, affordable, and equitably finance health insurance coverage for all medically necessary preventive, acute and chronic health care
and mental health care services, prescription drugs and devices.”) (footnotes omitted),
available at http://healthcareformass.org/about/amendment.shtml.
See, e.g., Minn. H.F. No. 683 (“Every Minnesota resident has the right health care. It is the
responsibility of the governor and the legislature to implement all necessary legislation to
ensure affordable health care.”), available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/
bldbill.php?bill=H0683.0.html&session=ls85.
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passed comprehensive health reform packages in the same year as the
333
Key lobbyists behind the Minnesota
proposals were introduced.
proposal acknowledged that the amendment was a starting point for
health reform and a way to gather and demonstrate public support
334
for comprehensive legislation.
In Massachusetts, sponsors of the
Health Care Reform Act urged their colleagues to support the legislation instead of the proposed amendment. The Massachusetts constitutional amendment, they suggested, “would restrict legislators from
quickly making inevitable tweaks” to the reform without going to a
335
336
referendum vote for every change.
In Michigan, the ballot proposal failed to gather the requisite signatures, getting lost in the
337
338
Oregon, hailed as a
Democratic Presidential Primary kerfuffle.
339
leader in health reform innovation, has seen three, failed attempts
333

334
335

336

337

338

339

An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care, ch. 58, § 142,
2006 Mass. Acts, available at http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/seslaw06/sl060058.htm;
Minn. S.F. No. 3780, available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/
bldbill.php?bill=S3780.1.html&session=ls85; Minnesota Dep’t. of Health, 2008 Health
Care
Reform
Summary,
available
at
http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/
opa/08reformsummary.html.
See Rüegg, supra note 329, at 8 n.18 (summarizing statement of Jennifer Schaubach, Legislative Director of AFL-CIO, Minnesota).
See id. at 6; Jim O’Sullivan & Priscilla Yeon, Lawmakers Nix Petition Guaranteeing Health Care
Access, STATE HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Boston, Jan. 2, 2007, at 1 (summarizing Representative Patricia Walrath’s comments), available at http://www.healthcareformass.org/press/
documents/LAWMAKERSNIXPETITIONGUARANTEEINGHEALTHCAREACCESS.pdf.
See Michigan Universal Health Care Action Network, Ballot Initiative, available at
http://www.healthcareformichigan.org/Pages/HealthCareForMichiganPetition.pdf
(“The state legislature shall pass laws to make sure that every Michigan resident has affordable and comprehensive health care coverage though a fair and cost-effective financing system. The legislature is required to pass a plan that, through public or private
measures, controls health care costs and provides for medically necessary preventive,
primary, acute and chronic health care needs.”). The Michigan proposal would have
amended Article 4, § 51: “[t]he public health and general welfare of the people of the
state are hereby declared to be matters of primary public concern. The legislature shall
pass suitable laws for the promotion and protection of the public health.” Id.
See Rüegg, supra note 329, at 11 (explaining how the lack of Democratic campaigning in
Michigan impeded fundraising for the ballot initiative); Associated Press, Dems Punish
Michigan for Early Primary, MSNBC, Dec. 1, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/22054151/.
OREGON CONST. art. I, § 46 (proposed), available at http://www.leg.state.or.us/08ss1/
measpdf/hjr100.dir/hjr0100.intro.pdf (“The people of Oregon find that health care is an
essential safeguard to human life and dignity and that access to health care is a fundamental right. In order to implement that right, the Legislative Assembly shall establish by
law a plan for a system designed to provide to every legal resident of the state access to effective and affordable health care on a regular basis.”).
See, e.g., Lawrence Jacobs et al., The Oregon Health Plan and the Political Paradox of Rationing:
What Advocates and Critics Have Claimed and What Oregon Did, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
161, 161 (1999) (“The Oregon Health Plan (OHP) has been widely heralded as an important innovation in medical care policy.”); Eric Lamond Robinson, The Oregon Basic
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by advocates to amend its constitution to include health care as a
fundamental right.
One can only speculate about the reasons that the proposed
340
amendments failed to be adopted.
But the experiences demonstrate that highly specific, rights-creating constitutional provisions on
health have not gained popular political support, even in seemingly
progressive states. Even if states are not willing to amend their constitutions to enshrine a health right, it would not be accurate to infer
that states do not value health care, especially because states rejecting
amendments subsequently enacted broad legislative health care reforms. The breadth and specificity of the proposed amendments that
failed to pass provide a useful contrast to the narrowly defined, nonmandatory tone of the currently enacted state constitutional provisions examined above. That contrast suggests reluctance by states to
provide broad constitutional guarantees of health care or to bind
themselves to affirmative obligations and specific guarantees that may
be difficult to uphold or modify.
IV. LESSONS FROM STATE CONSTITUTIONS
This final Part provides a brief assessment and prescription for
state constitutionalism and health care reform. States, consistent with
the U.S. Constitution’s negative rights tradition, do not seem inclined
to recognize a universal right to health care under their constitutions.
But a significant number of states accord constitutional weight to
health in certain limited ways that federal law does not. Those narrow exceptions and states’ reluctance to extend further the constitutional protections are evidence of the views of a broad section of society regarding the appropriate roles of government and individuals
in health care.

340

Health Services Act: A Model for State Reform?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 977, 1013 (1992) (describing
how the Oregon Basic Health Services Act delivers better and more equitable health care
than the federal system); Kathryn L. Tucker, Federalism in the Context of Assisted Dying: Time
for the Laboratory to Extend Beyond Oregon, to the Neighboring State of California, 41
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 863, 865–71 (2005) (discussing Oregon’s innovative physicianassisted suicide program); Casey Kaufman, Note, Oregon v. Ashcroft: The Attorney General’s Attempt to Override State Controlled Medical Practice, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1065, 1065-66
(2003) (describing the Oregon Death with Dignity Act).
See generally Rüegg, supra note 329 (discussing penalties for violating party rules).
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A. Assessment
The existing diversity of state constitutional approaches to health
reflects diverse views on state constitutionalism and states’ roles with
respect to individuals’ health. More than a dozen states give constitu341
tional imprimatur to health.
Judicial decisions in the seven states
examined demonstrate a general reluctance to recognize affirmative,
342
enforceable health rights. Indeed, there is not a single provision or
case supporting a universal right to publicly funded health care. The
clearest assertion of that sort of claim was soundly rejected before
343
reaching the merits. Several states recognize health as a fundamental or inalienable right and protect individuals’ right to obtain their
own health insurance or medical care, free from interference by the
state or others. Many expressly require legislative action to protect
344
and promote the vital interest in health.
In a few cases, claims to health rights fare better under state than
federal law. State constitutions that contain aspirational statements,
guarantee freedom to seek individual health care, or recognize state
authority (if not obligation) for public health are more protective of
health than the U.S. Constitution. Treatment for mentally ill or indigent persons, or for abortion or hospital care, may be required in
some states. But even those situations are limited to particular
groups of individuals and particular types of services for reasons that
345
do not support a universal right to health care. Other constitutions
mention health expressly but follow the federal preference for negative rights, declining to impose any affirmative duty on the state or
recognize individually enforceable rights. States’ recent attempts to
adopt constitutional provisions enshrining clear, comprehensive
health care rights and specific state duties have not received political
346
support.
States’ reluctance to recognize judicially constitutional claims to
individual health care rights should not be read as rejection of health
as an essential human interest or insensitivity to the health, welfare,
and safety of citizens. Rather, states may address those concerns
through the coordinate branches of government. The urge to elevate
health to an enforceable “right” seems to derive from the United
341
342
343
344
345
346

See infra Appendix B (summarizing state constitutional provisions).
See supra Part II.B.
Michigan Universal Health Care Action Network v. State, No. 261400, 2005 WL 3116595
(Mich. App. 2005).
See, e.g., WYO. CONST. art 7, § 20 (describing health as a “vital interest”).
See supra Part III.A–B.
See supra Part III.C.
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States tradition of according special prominence to constitutional
347
rights and granting courts, the Supreme Court in particular, a vir348
tual monopoly on constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, there
is a sense that any right worthy of attention must be subject to judicial
349
enforcement.
But the legislative and executive branches are similarly compelled to abide by the constitution in carrying out their
tasks. Legislators are expected prophylactically to consider the constitutionality of proposed legislation as much as courts rule retrospec350
tively on the enacted laws. Moreover, courts may be ill-equipped to
carry out the task of enforcing affirmative rights to adequate food,
351
shelter, clothing, employment, and health care.
Provision of gov347

348

349

350

351

See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (“In considering this
question, then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”); Gardner, supra note 66, at 814 (“This cryptic phrase aptly captures the judicial view, embraced
consistently ever since, that a constitution is different from other types of documents that
courts may be called upon to interpret . . . .”).
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law is.”); Michelman, supra
note 9, at 682 (discussing the “currently entrenched reliance on judicial review as an indispensable guarantor of the rule of constitutional law”); see also Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn,
The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1763, 1771 (2004) (noting Americans’ “predominant inclination has been to view the judiciary as exercising a monopoly
over constitutional interpretation”); Linde, supra note 232, at 168 (suggesting that the
“legitimacy” of judicial review “to set[] aside unconstitutional laws” is “the issue to which
every law student is introduced by Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison.”).
See Sunstein, supra note 20, at 14 (“[I]n the American culture, constitutions are seen as
pragmatic instruments—suited for, and not inextricable from, judicial enforcement.”);
Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1211 (“[M]any appear to believe that, at least in advanced constitutional systems, civil rights must be enforceable through some sort of judicial proceeding.”).
Paul Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 661, 670–71 (1985) (rebutting judicial exclusivity and placing responsibility on all branches to consider constitutional issues); Michelman, supra note 9, at 671, 685 (concluding that constitutional recognition of socioeconomic rights as a moral imperative on lawmakers may be separated from judicial review
of constitutional law); Sager, supra note 11, at 435 (proposing an understanding that we
are “constitutionally obliged . . . to address the injustice of poverty and entrenched racial
disadvantage, but see the primary addresses of this obligation as elected officials rather
than judges.”); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 16 (refuting institutional explanation for lack
of social and economic rights, suggesting that “courts could take steps to ensure that basic
needs receive a degree of legislative priority, and to correct conspicuous neglect.”).
See Michelman, supra note 9, at 669 (“The choices needing to be made are subtle, technical, interactive, uncertain, subject-to-experience, and endlessly debatable. It is far from
clear how courts of law can inject themselves into such matters with much credibility or
authority.”); Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 TEX. L.
REV. 1895, 1896 (2004) (suggesting that a common argument against constitutional recognition of social welfare rights is that they “cannot be enforced in the courts because
their enforcement requires the courts to make decisions that have large-scale consequences for government budgets”); see also Kinney, supra note 3, at 300 (“A more useful
observation about individual enforcement of economic and social rights is that the de-
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ernment services and implementation of social programs may be bet352
ter handled legislatively than judicially.
The role of the political branches in state constitutionalism is particularly salient. Although not as nimble as statutes, state constitutions are amended much more frequently and with much greater po353
litical involvement than the federal Constitution. Given the politics
of state constitutionalism, it is appropriate that legislative and administrative roles figure prominently in state constitutional theory and
354
interpretation.
Many states that include health in their constitutions mandate legislative action or allow delegation to local authorities and agencies, as well as private actors, to address health or public
355
health needs. Ironically, some of those provisions have the effect of
reducing protection for individuals by cloaking state actors with im-

352

353

354

355

termination of their content involves facts and issues that are not appropriate for courts
or other adjudicative tribunals to decide.”).
Bork, supra note 11, at 700 (stating that “[c]ourts simply are not equipped, much less authorized, to make . . . decisions” regarding the repeal of welfare statutes); Michelman, supra note 9, at 669–71 (discussing the widely-held view that courts “are ill-equipped for
fine-tuned appraisals of governmental efforts” toward socioeconomic guarantees); Sager,
supra note 11, at 420 (noting that implementation of social programs involves “immensely
complex questions of social strategy and social responsibility . . . . that seem far better addressed by the legislative and executive branches of government, questions that seem virtually out of the reach of the judiciary”); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 16 (“American courts
have been reluctant to recognize social and economic rights, in part because of a belief
that enforcement and protection of such rights would strain judicial capacities.”); Tushnet, supra note 19, at 1211 (“[C]ourts . . . are ill-suited to enforce social rights; courts
cannot devise effective methods of ensuring that shelter, food or jobs are available to citizens.”).
TARR, supra note 63, at 23 (noting that “the federal Constitution has been amended less
than once per decade,” compared to states, which regularly amend and revise their constitutions); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the Domain of Normative Theory,
37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523, 527 (2000) (“[A] key distinction between the federal and state
constitutions concerns the frequency of amendments over time.”); Lawrence G. Sager,
The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 895 (noting that the U.S. “Constitution
is markedly obdurate to textual change”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 429–30 (noting the
“greater ease of amending state constitutions and the greater electoral accountability of
state judges”); Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS:
J. FEDERALISM 57, 57 (1982) (noting that “Since 1776, the fifty states have operated under
no fewer than 145 constitutions” and tracing history of various amendments and
changes).
Rodriguez, supra note 353, at 529–30 (“[A] difference between federal and state constitutionalism is a shift in focus from courts as the ultimate audiences for normative constitutional theory to the legislature and administrative agencies.”); cf. Kahn, supra note 63, at
471 (“An easily amended constitution may represent only a temporary resting place in an
unsettled debate over public values. Such a constitution does not stand dramatically
apart from ordinary politics.”).
See supra Part II.B.1–5 (discussing Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Mississippi, South
Carolina); see also infra Appendices A (listing text of provisions) and B (summarizing similarities).
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munity from liability. In sum, state constitutional law suggests ambivalence about health as an enforceable individual right but not a total
lack of state concern for the health of individuals and populations.
B. Prescription
State constitutionalism does not provide a roadmap for health
reform but does suggest certain trends that federal and state lawmakers should consider as they debate the future of the health care system. Perhaps the clearest message that can be derived from state
constitutionalism is that any proposal for a universal, governmentprovided right to health care would not be widely supported. Indeed,
Congress’s recent federal reforms never seriously considered a singlepayer proposal and ultimately rejected even a more modest “public
356
option.”
States that constitutionally recognize the importance of
health and limited state duties to provide health care do not guarantee health care to all residents. Attempts to litigate those sorts of
claims or enact amendments guaranteeing universal health care
rights have not succeeded. States, although raising the federal floor
on protection of health in small degrees, generally adhere to the
negative rights view that health is a matter of individual responsibility.
To the extent that health is enshrined as a right in state constitutions,
the provisions suggest merely that states cannot interfere with individual health care decisions or access, not that states must provide
health care to all.
The survey of state constitutions demonstrates that states embrace
their traditional reserved police powers to regulate public safety, public health, insurance companies, medical professions, and the environment to varying degrees. Federal reforms that intrude on tradi357
tional state powers will draw strong resistance. States will jealously
356

357

See Shailagh Murray, House Health Care Reform Bill to Include Public Option, WASH. POST,
Oct.
29,
2009,
at
A7,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/10/28/AR2009102804756.html; Robert Pear & David M.
Herszenhorn, Public Option Push in Senate Comes with Escape Hatch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/health/policy/27health.
html?_r=1&hp; see, e.g., Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Side-by-Side Comparison of
Major Health Care Reform Proposals, at 31 (describing H.R. 676 proposal to create federal health insurance program for all U.S. residents and comparing other bills) (updated
April 7, 2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/healthreform_
sbs_full.pdf.
See, e.g., Complaint, State of Florida v. Sebelius, (N.D. Fla., March 23, 2010), available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/webfiles.nsf/WF/MRAY-83TKWB/$file/HealthCareReform
Lawsuit.pdf. (asserting various constitutional arguments by 13 states, including Tenth
Amendment, against Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); see also Kirk Johnson,
States’ Rights is Rallying Cry Of Lawmakers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2010, at A1 available at
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guard both their power to regulate in those areas as well as their
choice to not regulate. States regulate medical professionals, health
care facilities, and health insurance companies, but generally leave
patients free to control and arrange payment for their own medical
treatment. State constitutional law suggests a strong negative rights
orientation, leaving individuals to pursue their own health care but
not obligating the state to provide for them.
States may exercise greater powers in the areas of environmental
and public health in order to promote the common good. Those examples suggest that if health care reform can be reframed as a collective action or public goods problem, the proposals may gain better
traction. Mandatory vaccination intrudes on personal autonomy and
medical decision making, but serves the common good by protecting
society from infectious diseases. Similarly, mandatory health insur358
ance, while arguably intruding on individual economic rights, may
serve the common good by effecting broader risk pools and making
359
health insurance more affordable for all. Recognizing states’ greater receptivity to strong public health powers and framing health
reform in those terms may be a way to overcome resistance.
Another approach would be to draw on states’ recognition of a
constitutional duty to provide health care to the indigent, in some
cases, more generously than federal law. That state law trend evidences the view of a significant portion of the population that health
care is not entirely a matter of individual responsibility, at least when
it comes to people who are unable to obtain health care on the private market through their own efforts. Brought into the health
reform debate, those opinions suggest support for government subsi-

358

359

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/us/17states.html; Timothy S. Jost, Can the States
Nullify Health Care Reform?, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 869, 869 (2010) (describing trend of
state resolutions aimed at nullifying federal health reform); Lisa Rosetta, Most Say Opt Out
of Health Reform, SALT LAKE TRIB., Jan. 26, 2010 (reporting poll results that majority of
Utahans
favor
state
level
reform
to
federal
reform),
available
at
http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_14265496; Richard Cauchi, National Conference of State
Legislatures,
State
Legislation
Challenging
Certain
Reforms,
2010,
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=18906 (identifying thirty-nine states with pending legislation objecting to various provisions of federal health reform, including the public option and individual mandate).
See Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 38, 44-45 (2009) (discussing how mandated health coverage would affect the
economic rights of individuals and employers).
See Blumberg & Holahan, supra note 76, at 6.
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dies for those unable to afford private health insurance and expan360
sion of existing government health care programs.
Some of the trends in state constitutionalism offer less clear implications for health reform. For example, states that constitutionally
provide care for the insane likely reflect states’ historical roles in caring for incompetent individuals or incapacitating dangerous ones, rather than progressive views on the importance of mental health
treatment for all. Those states’ constitutions should not be read as
guarantees of state-funded care for anxiety, attention-deficit disorder,
depression, or a range of other less severe psychiatric conditions that
individuals suffer.
The exception that some states recognize to provide medical care
to prisoners and others in state custody is also a narrow right. The
right derives from the fact that those individuals have been deprived
by state action of the ability to access health care on their own. It
would be a stretch to translate that unique, specific policy into the
broader language of health reform. Any suggestions that the uninsured or others who are unable to access medical care are “incompetent” and in need of state protection, or that affirmative state action
has placed them in that condition, are likely to be unconvincing.
Similarly, state constitutions that more vigorously protect abortion
rights than federal law reflect a host of moral, religious, political, and
scientific views having little to do with health care more broadly
speaking. The abortion rights debate has its own political discourse,
which, if interjected into the health reform debate, would likely undermine support for health care rights. Indeed, federal proposals to
require any new government health care benefit to cover abortions
361
drew acrimonious responses, and the final law expressly excepts
362
abortion from any federal funding.
States that limit their duty to inpatient hospital care may represent
nothing more than an outdated view of medicine that undervalues

360
361

362

See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1402, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (subsidies); id. § 2001 (Medicaid expansion),
See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Rob Stein, Abortion Opponents Criticize Health Reform Bills, WASH.
POST, July 23, 2009, at A5, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/07/22/AR2009072201583.html; Mandated Abortion Coverage
Threatens Health Care Reform, U.S. Bishops’ Official Says, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY, Aug. 8,
2009, available at http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/new.php?n=16798; Karen Tumulty, Could Abortion Coverage Sink Health-Care Reform?, TIME, July 8, 2009, available at
http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1909178,00.html.
Exec. Order No. 13535, 75 Fed. Reg. 15599 (Mar. 24, 2010) (“Ensuring Enforcement and
Implementation of Abortion Restrictions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act”).

1398

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:5

the importance of routine, preventative care. Modern health insurance plans and government health care programs encourage early
diagnosis and prevention of health conditions that become more ex363
pensive to treat later rather than sooner.
The hospital-only and
other attempts by states to narrowly circumscribe their health care
duties reflect the unavoidable reality that health care resources are
364
scarce and must be rationed to some degree.
That tension persistently underlies much of the health reform debate. States’ constitutions offer little guidance for lawmakers making those difficult resource-allocation choices.
Setting aside the specific constitutional provisions and judicial decisions, the larger lesson of this survey and analysis of state constitutional law is recognition of the vital role that states play in health care
delivery and reform. State constitutions offer a composite of views
and approaches to guide reform at the federal and state levels. Even
365
if differing political norms align only incidentally with state borders,
state constitutions and state politics offer more accessible fora for ex366
pressing individual, even dissenting, opinions. Coalitions organized

363

364

365

366

See Bruce D. Platt & Lisa D. Stream, Dispelling the Negative Myths of Managed Care: An Analysis of Anti-Managed Care Legislation and the Quality of Care Provided by Health Maintenance
Organizations, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 489, 502–05 (1995); Utz, supra note 80, at 132; Robert
S. Gold, Editorial, An Ounce of Prevention for the Debate on Health Care Reform, BALTIMORE
SUN, Aug. 6, 2009, at 15A, available at http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/
opinion/oped/bal-op.prevention06aug06,0,5754911.story.
See Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration Health Care, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 19, 2009, MM38,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/magazine/19healthcaret.html?pagewanted=all. But see David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Is Government Health
Care Constitutional?, WALL ST. J., June 22, 2009, at A15.
See Gardner, supra note 66, at 818 (“[W]hatever currency the notion of local variations in
character and values might once have had, it is a notion that no longer describes in any
realistic way the politics of the present day states.”); Kahn, supra note 232, at 1150, 1168
(stating that “[i]f states are no longer the locus of a vibrant, community experience, then
a state constitutionalism that looks to the unique state community for its sources of decisionmaking promises to remain a marginal factor in American public life,” urging instead
state constitutionalism as “a process of giving voice to the state court’s understanding of
the values and principles of the national community”); Hans A. Linde, supra note 232, at
194 (“Federalism divides our laws along state lines, but those lines do not match divisions
in American society. . . . What national theory treats as a minority often is a majority in
part or all of a state.”); Schapiro, supra note 66, at 428–40 & n.148 (reviewing and rebutting state identity arguments but nevertheless identifying a role for independent interpretation of state constitutions).
See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009) (suggesting potential benefits for policymaking as a result of state resistance
and dissent to federal reforms); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1311 (2004) (“Federalism is about dividing power . . . . [and] providing institutional space for a diversity of
political views.”).
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around state politics to address state-level concerns may have stronger
voices than they would at the federal level. States, as subunits of the
federal government, offer greater access to the political process and
367
opportunities to affect policy.
The proposals for health care rights constitutional amendments
demonstrate the value of state constitutionalism as opportunities to
vet ideas and highlight policy concerns, even if, and perhaps because,
368
the proposed amendments failed to be adopted. In those debates,
lawmakers and voters were squarely compelled to consider whether
health is a “constitutional” value or, at least, a pressing public concern demanding legislative action. Despite the failed constitutional
amendment in Massachusetts, for example, that state’s reform pack369
age now serves as a comprehensive model. Watching the results of
that experiment, other states and federal policymakers can develop
370
proposals that encompass the successes and avoid the pitfalls.
Moreover, if health care is to be enshrined as a constitutional
right at all, it is more appropriately recognized at the state level. If a
state ultimately does manage to enact a rights-creating constitutional
amendment, other states could observe, evaluate, and perhaps follow.
By contrast, a federal constitutional right would raise the minimum
371
floor, narrowing the space for experimentation.
Scholars have comprehensively identified the many challenges associated with constitutional recognition of affirmative, enforceable
372
rights. Nevertheless, there is still something to be said for constitu367

368
369
370

371

372

See Kahn, supra note 232, at 1166 (noting “a longstanding justification of federalism under which state governments provide a forum for discussion, disagreement, and opposition to actions of the national government”); Long, supra note 64, at 46 (“States will
probably never be the primary community or source of identity for most Americans. On
the other hand, states may play some small part, at least once in a while, for nearly all
Americans. Intermittent state constitutionalism recognizes and encourages this polyvalent sense of cultural identity.”); Rodriguez, supra note 44, at 271 (observing that state
constitutions are “intrinsically important as legal frameworks for the implementation of
public policy”).
See supra Part III.C.
See supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text (describing Massachusetts 2006 Health
Reform Plan and proposals under President Obama’s administration).
See, e.g., Robert Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for Payment Reform
in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1036 (2009); Abby Goodnough, Massachusetts Adjusts a Cut, Providing Some Health Care for 30,000 Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at
A19; The Massachusetts Model, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at wk 7.
Gardner, supra note 64, at 490 (arguing that if the purpose of state experimentation “is to
influence the Court’s development of federal constitutional law, the effect of success can
only be to persuade the Court to raise the federal floor—thereby depriving the states of a
measure of their autonomy”).
See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 19, at 2327–42 (discussing arguments against recognition of
affirmative rights in section on “The Fear of Chaos: Floodgates, Slippery Slopes, and
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tionalizing certain values and bestowing with them that weight of importance. Individual health is undeniably fundamental in the common parlance, non-constitutional sense of the word. Without a
healthy body and mind, an individual cannot fully participate in
many other aspects of society. Including health in state constitutions
serves as “a constant headline,” guiding lawmakers and reminding the
373
public of its importance. State constitutions that provide even weak
protection for health serve that headlining function, even if they do
not create robust, individually enforceable rights. Several nations’
constitutions contain similar nonjusticiable “directive principles” ex374
pressing fundamental values and requiring legislative action.
Nonjusticiable constitutional expressions of health are not legally
375
irrelevant, as demonstrated by the state judicial decisions surveyed
in this Article. The state constitutional provisions on health were not
always decisional but certainly instructive to the courts’ opinions,
even when merely granting governmental immunity or approving
state funding for health care. The right, duty, concern, or other constitutional reference to health at the very least called on courts to
consider the impact of their decisions on the health of individuals in
the state. As the cases reveal, health bears on many other substantive
areas of law, including criminal, disability, family, environmental,
torts, poverty, and abortion. Health is central to state governance,
whether explicitly recognized in the constitution or inextricably intertwined with other state laws and values. Therefore, ardent advocates of health care rights should not be troubled by the absence of

373
374

375

Judicial Incapacity”); Cross, supra note 19, at 878–93 (discussing various arguments from
critics of positive rights, including cost, judicial competence, and politics); Michelman,
supra note 9, at 668–72 (listing “instrumental reasons” for the American constitutions’
failure to include socioeconomic rights); Sunstein, supra note 20, at 15 (suggesting a litany of questions that would arise if the Constitution included affirmative rights).
See Jacobsohn, supra note 348, at 1770 (quoting framers of Irish Constitution on inclusion
of nonjusticiable Directive Principles (Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 45 (Social Policy))).
See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 37 (“The provisions contained in this Part [IV] shall not be enforceable by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental
in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.”); Ir. CONST., 1937, ch. XIII, art. 45 (announcing “principles of social policy . . . intended for the general guidance of [Parliament]” and specifying that
they “shall not be cognizable by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution”); NIG. CONST., art I7 (providing for nomination of candidates for election into public offices); PAPUA N.G. CONST. pmbl. para. 2 (declaring independence and sovereignty).
See Kinney & Clark, supra note 20, at 301 (“[T]he right as policy imperative requires
bound states to take legislative action and array national budgetary priorities in ways that
fulfill that policy imperative.”); Tushnet, supra note 351, at 1898 (“Nonjusticiable
rights . . . can be used to interpret ambiguous statutes [or to] explain why the courts
refuse to recognize other rights . . . .”).
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enforceable constitutional guarantees of health in the federal or separate state constitutions. The multiple deficiencies in the United
States’ health care system to provide essential health care to individuals already are receiving considerable attention. State constitutions
376
are admittedly imperfect, incongruent, and politicized.
But the
realpolitik of state constitutional law does not undermine its value as
an essential collection of voices in the health reform conversation.
CONCLUSION
Although state constitutions and case law offer little support for a
cognizable right to health, the conclusion is not without promise for
improving health care in the country. State constitutions are charter
documents expressing citizens’ values, priorities, and aspirations.
The lack of enforceable state constitutional rights does not necessarily undermine the importance of health. Constitutional expressions
and debates over health care rights, duties, and powers fuel the political process, ultimately allowing states and the federal government to
make informed choices of how best to address the health concerns of
their citizens. The diversity of approaches to constitutional recognition, or even non-recognition, of health is not a weakness but a value
of the federalist system.

376

See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 66, at 763 (“[S]tate constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”); Linde,
supra note 232, at 196 (“Most state constitutions are dusty stuff – too much detail, too
much diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too much preoccupation
with offices, their composition and administration, and forever with money, money,
money.”)
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Appendix A

Provision

Year of
Adoption

ALA. CONST. ART. IV,
§ 93.12

1946

ALASKA CONST. ART.
VII, § 4

1956

Current Text
The state … may acquire,
build, establish, own, operate and maintain hospitals,
health centers, sanatoria and
other health facilities. The
legislature for such purposes
may appropriate public
funds and may authorize
counties, municipalities and
other political subdivisions
to appropriate their funds,
and may designate or create
an agency or agencies to accept and administer funds
appropriated or donated for
such purposes by the United
States government to the
state upon such terms and
conditions as may be imposed by the United States
government.
The legislature shall provide
for the promotion and protection of public health.

ARK. CONST. ART. 19,
§ 19

1874

It shall be the duty of the
General Assembly to provide by law for the support
of institutions for the education of the deaf and dumb
and the blind, and also for
the treatment of the insane.

HAW. CONST. ART. IX,
§1

1978

The State shall provide for
the protection and promotion of the public health.
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HAW. CONST. ART. IX,
§3

1978

ILL. CONST. PMBL.

1970

LA. CONST. ART. XII,
§8

1974

MICH. CONST. ART. 4,
§ 51

1963

MISS. CONST. ART. IV,
§ 86

1869

MO. CONST. ART. 4, §
37

1972

1403

The State shall have the
power to provide financial
assistance, medical assistance and social services for
persons who are found to be
in need of and are eligible
for such assistance and services as provided by law.
We, the People of the State
of Illinois — grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political and religious liberty
which He has permitted us
to enjoy and seeking His
blessing upon our endeavors
— in order to provide for the
health, safety and welfare of
the people…
The legislature may establish a system of economic
and social welfare, unemployment compensation, and
public health.
The public health and general welfare of the people of
the state are hereby declared
to be matters of primary
public concern. The legislature shall pass suitable laws
for the protection and promotion of the public health.
It shall be the duty of the
Legislature to provide by
law for the treatment and
care of the insane; and the
Legislature may provide for
the care of the indigent sick
in the hospitals in the State.
The health and general welfare of the people are mat-

1404

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:5

ters of primary public concern; and to secure them
there shall be established a
department of social services in charge of a director appointed by the governor, by
and with the advice and consent of the senate, charged
with promoting improved
health and other social services to the citizens of the
state as provided by law, and
the general assembly may
grant power with respect
thereto to counties, cities or
other political subdivisions
of the state.

MONT. CONST. ART II,
§ 3.

N.C. CONST. ART. XI
§4

1972

All persons are born free
and have certain inalienable
rights. They include the
right to a clean and healthful
environment and the rights
of pursuing life's basic necessities, enjoying and defending their lives and liberties, acquiring, possessing
and protecting property, and
seeking their safety, health
and happiness in all lawful
ways. In enjoying these
rights, all persons recognize
corresponding responsibilities.

1970

Beneficent provision for the
poor, the unfortunate, and
the orphan is one of the first
duties of a civilized and a
Christian state. Therefore
the General Assembly shall
provide for and define the
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N.Y. CONST. ART. 17,
§1

1938

N.Y. CONST. ART. 17,
§3

1938

S.C. CONST. ART. XII,
§1

1971

WYO. CONST. ART. 7,
§ 20

1890

1405

duties of a board of public
welfare.
The aid, care and support of
the needy are public concerns and shall be provided
by the state and by such of
its subdivisions, and in such
manner and by such means,
as the legislature may from
time to time determine.
The protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state are
matters of public concern
and provision therefore shall
be made by the state and by
such of its subdivisions and
in such manner, and by such
means as the legislature
shall from time to time determine.
The health, welfare, and
safety of the lives and property of the people of this
State and the conservation of
its natural resources are matters of public concern. The
General Assembly shall
provide appropriate agencies
to function in these areas of
public concern and determine the activities, powers,
and duties of such agencies.
As the health and morality
of the people are essential to
their well-being,... it shall be
the duty of the legislature to
protect and promote these
vital interests
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Appendix B

Right,
Term/Concept Appears in Provision
Duty,
State
Shall/May
Public
Public Mentally
Environ.
Indigent
Concern
Health
Ill
ALABAMA
N/A
May
ALASKA
Duty
Shall
X
ARKANSAS
Duty
Shall
X
HAWAII § 1
Duty
Shall
X
HAWAII § 3
Duty
Shall
X
ILLINOIS
Right
N/A
X
LOUISIANA
N/A
May
X
Public
MICHIGAN
Shall
X
Concern
MISSISSIPPI
Duty
Shall
X
X
Public
MISSOURI
Shall
Concern
MONTANA
Right
N/A
X
NEW YORK Public
Shall
X
§1
Concern
NEW YORK Public
Shall
X
§3
Concern
N.
Duty
N/A
X
CAROLINA
Public
S.
Shall
X
X
CAROLINA Concern
WYOMING
Duty
Shall
X

